Sermon

Shades of Creationism 3

Trinity Baptist Church - Sermons

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  1. Well, let us start up. Why don't we start with prayer.

  2. Father God, thank you for this day.

  3. Thank you for this opportunity that we can gather together and think about you.

  4. I ask, Lord, that this class would be edifying to the body,

  5. that we would glorify you with our interactions,

  6. and that we would be able to leave today with a better understanding of our fellow Christians.

  7. In Jesus' name, amen.

  8. Okay, so, as, you know, it's tradition now.

  9. Let's do preamble.

  10. So, the preamble today is basically can be summed up as, I'm inadequate.

  11. So, this is a very complicated discussion,

  12. and as I was preparing for today's class,

  13. I realized that I had to truncate a whole bunch of things

  14. to fit everything in that I wanted to fit in.

  15. And so, I guess what I want to say is that

  16. if a specific point that I'm making or argument that I'm making

  17. doesn't sound particularly persuasive in the way that I have articulated it,

  18. just know that there is an entire book on that argument that you can read

  19. that will most likely make more sense than the way I'm putting it together.

  20. Although, who knows? I mean, I don't know.

  21. Okay, so with that being said, let's start our final class today,

  22. which is going to actually start touching on what I've been hinting at in the subtitle,

  23. which is Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution.

  24. The last two classes, we've been dealing with sort of the historical background.

  25. What do I mean when I say Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution?

  26. What kind of arguments are they making?

  27. Last class, we talked about how different biblical interpretations of Genesis

  28. can either leave room for or not leave room for evolutionary mechanisms,

  29. among many other things.

  30. And now we're going to deal with the positions themselves.

  31. But before we do that, I'd like to start with just a very simple crash course

  32. in scientific reasoning.

  33. Okay, so just as an explainer of how there can be differences of opinion

  34. when it comes to scientific information,

  35. and what does that even mean, right?

  36. And a question that was asked in the first class,

  37. or was it the second class?

  38. You know, they all rub together now.

  39. There was the question of, you know,

  40. how can we have different interpretations of science, essentially?

  41. And I want to explain a little bit about how that is.

  42. So how is science actually done, right?

  43. That is the question.

  44. Science is very fruitful.

  45. But it's not that science is something that does not require interpretation

  46. or other forms of communication.

  47. So as Christians, we believe in what is called the correspondence view of truth, right?

  48. Which means that for something to be true, it has to correspond to reality, right?

  49. So that is actually pretty straightforward.

  50. But I'm just going to posit that because all of the scientific reasoning

  51. that we are going to be talking about today,

  52. and a lot of the arguments flowing from that,

  53. are assuming this view of truth.

  54. That there is something real.

  55. There is something called reality.

  56. reality that when we understand it,

  57. we can gain knowledge that is true, right?

  58. And so in science, what we're trying to do

  59. is actually get a little piece of this reality,

  60. get a glimpse of it,

  61. using repetition, instrumentation,

  62. eliminating variables,

  63. among a whole host of other things, right?

  64. So if I was going to try to diagram it,

  65. it would look something like this.

  66. We have this thing called reality, right?

  67. It's real, you know, by definition.

  68. Here's this thing called reality.

  69. And in science, what we're trying to do

  70. is we're trying to observe

  71. some facet of this reality

  72. using instruments, often.

  73. You know, I mean, back in the day,

  74. they would just use their eyeballs.

  75. But I guess if you could, you know,

  76. in a certain sort of reductive way,

  77. call your eyeballs instruments, right?

  78. But yeah, we're going to be observing reality,

  79. some facet of reality.

  80. Based on this observation,

  81. this is going to give us some sort of data output, right?

  82. And this is what kind of output you get

  83. is going to be dependent

  84. what kind of instrument you're using

  85. and the way that you're trying to observe, right?

  86. Because, believe it or not,

  87. the observation itself

  88. is not necessarily the data output,

  89. although observation is a form of data, right?

  90. But oftentimes,

  91. the instrument is observing something

  92. and it tells us something

  93. about what it's observing, right?

  94. Finally, on top of this data output,

  95. we're going to be interpreting the output, right?

  96. So we get this number

  97. or this picture

  98. or this, you know,

  99. solution

  100. or pellet,

  101. whatever it is.

  102. We get some sort of output

  103. and on top of this output,

  104. we are going to be

  105. interpreting the data

  106. to make sense

  107. in what we already know

  108. about the world,

  109. to posit new facets

  110. of how the world is working

  111. based on the output you've gotten.

  112. And on top of this interpretation,

  113. we're now going to be building a worldview, right?

  114. So this is the layer,

  115. the layers of scientific reasoning, okay?

  116. And so

  117. in most scientific circles,

  118. this is sort of seen as a,

  119. unbreakable chain, right?

  120. The reality

  121. necessarily leads to,

  122. leads to the observation,

  123. which necessarily leads to this data output,

  124. which necessarily

  125. is interpreted correctly this way,

  126. which necessarily means

  127. in a big worldview sense,

  128. X, right?

  129. So,

  130. but is that necessarily true?

  131. Do we have to,

  132. is it an unbreakable chain?

  133. And, you know,

  134. people who,

  135. so I guess I should say

  136. maybe the popular view of science

  137. is that this is an unbreakable chain,

  138. right?

  139. People who are actually doing science

  140. know that,

  141. you know,

  142. these chains are often

  143. very, very weak.

  144. And so,

  145. oftentimes,

  146. a lot of what we're trying to do

  147. is

  148. determine how,

  149. you know,

  150. how can we reliably say

  151. that this X equals this,

  152. right?

  153. So,

  154. what's the Christian's responsibility

  155. in all of this,

  156. right?

  157. So,

  158. we've talked over the last few classes

  159. about the fact that

  160. Scripture being our highest authority,

  161. we were committed to the claims of Scripture,

  162. but also Scripture testifies

  163. to the reliability

  164. of what we can learn from nature,

  165. right?

  166. And because we affirm

  167. Scripture,

  168. we,

  169. in some sense,

  170. Christians are responsible

  171. for the realities of nature.

  172. So,

  173. at a very base level,

  174. Christians are responsible

  175. to the truth of this,

  176. right?

  177. This thing here,

  178. reality,

  179. is real,

  180. right?

  181. And Christians have to affirm that

  182. at the very least,

  183. right?

  184. Secondly,

  185. I would say,

  186. to a lesser extent,

  187. Christians are,

  188. have to be,

  189. by way of being intellectually honest,

  190. we have to at least

  191. affirm

  192. the observations

  193. with the instruments

  194. and the data

  195. that the instruments put out,

  196. right?

  197. Now,

  198. the reason I say

  199. to a lesser extent

  200. is because

  201. these observations

  202. with instruments

  203. are not the reality themselves.

  204. These are ways

  205. of getting at the reality

  206. and scientists know

  207. depending on the instrument

  208. you use,

  209. the reality may look different.

  210. Depending on

  211. the way that you use

  212. the instrument,

  213. the data output

  214. might be different,

  215. right?

  216. And so,

  217. these are

  218. extrapolations

  219. from the reality,

  220. but they're not

  221. the reality itself.

  222. So,

  223. I think,

  224. at the very least,

  225. Christians need

  226. to be able to say,

  227. yes,

  228. there is something real

  229. that scientists

  230. are observing

  231. or trying to observe

  232. that I,

  233. as a Christian,

  234. must say,

  235. that is true.

  236. Okay?

  237. If we think about

  238. our last class,

  239. this is where

  240. the differences

  241. between the philosophical

  242. views about

  243. balancing general

  244. and special revelation

  245. comes in

  246. because maybe

  247. you're thinking

  248. about the first group

  249. that I talked about

  250. which would be

  251. the science skeptics

  252. and the science skeptics

  253. would say,

  254. really,

  255. there is no way

  256. to get from reality

  257. to observations

  258. with instruments,

  259. right?

  260. I mean,

  261. like,

  262. they get stuff right

  263. sometimes,

  264. but there really

  265. isn't any consistent

  266. way to get at this,

  267. right?

  268. But I think

  269. most Christians

  270. would consider

  271. it their responsibility

  272. to affirm

  273. that there is

  274. a reality

  275. that is being

  276. observed with

  277. instruments

  278. and it is putting

  279. out some sort

  280. of information,

  281. okay?

  282. So,

  283. but,

  284. what about

  285. these next levels?

  286. The interpretation

  287. of output

  288. and the worldview

  289. based on Pata.

  290. Now,

  291. everybody,

  292. all Christians

  293. of all stripes,

  294. right,

  295. whether they be

  296. intelligent design

  297. advocates,

  298. theistic evolutionists,

  299. creationists,

  300. they are all

  301. going to say

  302. the worldview,

  303. the interpretation

  304. to worldview

  305. connection

  306. is not,

  307. is not something

  308. that we as Christians

  309. need to affirm

  310. and oftentimes

  311. we as Christians

  312. need to fight

  313. against that

  314. interpretation,

  315. right?

  316. Even a theistic

  317. evolutionist

  318. would be arguing

  319. that the scientific

  320. materialism

  321. that often results

  322. from the interpretations

  323. of the data

  324. is not warranted.

  325. It's a philosophical,

  326. metaphysical argument

  327. that is not,

  328. that is maybe

  329. is understandable

  330. in light of the data

  331. but is not required,

  332. right?

  333. And so,

  334. we would all argue,

  335. boom,

  336. this connection

  337. we as Christians

  338. can argue against

  339. and often should

  340. be arguing against

  341. of all stripes,

  342. right?

  343. obviously,

  344. as Christians

  345. we have to at least

  346. argue against

  347. scientific materialism,

  348. right?

  349. Otherwise,

  350. you know,

  351. that assumes

  352. there is no God,

  353. right?

  354. And as Christians

  355. that, you know,

  356. puts us in a weird

  357. position.

  358. So,

  359. now secondly,

  360. now this is where

  361. a lot of the

  362. disagreements come in

  363. between Christians.

  364. As I said before,

  365. most people would argue

  366. that the data output

  367. that comes out

  368. from our observations

  369. is something that

  370. we need to affirm

  371. is real in some sense,

  372. right?

  373. With qualifications,

  374. right?

  375. And scientists know

  376. all the qualifications,

  377. right?

  378. Everybody,

  379. I mean,

  380. I don't know

  381. about the other

  382. scientists in the room,

  383. but I do get annoyed

  384. when you read

  385. a scientific publication

  386. and then you read

  387. the news articles

  388. from the scientific

  389. publication,

  390. right?

  391. We've all had

  392. this experience

  393. in the scientific

  394. community where you're

  395. like,

  396. oh man,

  397. they did not get it.

  398. You know,

  399. they're not making

  400. the kinds of

  401. qualifications

  402. that are necessary

  403. to get at the

  404. accuracy of what's

  405. going on.

  406. Yeah,

  407. you could understand

  408. the data that they

  409. put out in the way

  410. that you're describing,

  411. but nobody would

  412. actually argue that

  413. that's actually

  414. what's going on.

  415. Okay?

  416. So,

  417. we're all familiar

  418. with that,

  419. but qualifications

  420. in mind,

  421. there are basically

  422. two different groups

  423. understanding

  424. how are we going

  425. to argue

  426. against this

  427. interpretation

  428. of output.

  429. There are Christians

  430. who say,

  431. this interpretation

  432. of output

  433. is very reliable,

  434. right?

  435. And then there

  436. are Christians

  437. who say,

  438. I am not required

  439. to accept this

  440. and I'm going

  441. to argue

  442. my own case

  443. against it

  444. based on the data,

  445. right?

  446. So,

  447. and this actually

  448. comes down

  449. to

  450. the second

  451. tension in creation

  452. as I've been

  453. talking about.

  454. But I guess I just

  455. want to get across

  456. in this section

  457. here that

  458. it's not just

  459. Christians who

  460. need to be

  461. skeptical about

  462. this chain of

  463. reasoning,

  464. right?

  465. And it's not just

  466. Christians who are

  467. skeptical.

  468. Scientists are

  469. often very

  470. critical of

  471. other scientists'

  472. interpretation of

  473. data,

  474. especially if

  475. your interpretation

  476. of your own

  477. data differs

  478. with their

  479. interpretation,

  480. right?

  481. That's when the

  482. gloves come off

  483. and the fighting

  484. really begins

  485. metaphorically.

  486. So,

  487. you know,

  488. hopefully metaphorically.

  489. So,

  490. yeah,

  491. we all argue

  492. about the

  493. interpretation of

  494. the data.

  495. The question is

  496. at what point

  497. should Christians

  498. affirm so-called

  499. consensus in

  500. the interpretation

  501. of the data?

  502. versus not,

  503. right?

  504. So,

  505. what's this

  506. second tension

  507. in creationism

  508. all about?

  509. Okay?

  510. So,

  511. the second tension

  512. in creationism

  513. I'm going to

  514. talk about

  515. has to do

  516. with God's

  517. activity,

  518. right?

  519. What is God's

  520. activity?

  521. How can we

  522. understand it?

  523. So,

  524. first of all,

  525. Christianity

  526. asserts

  527. that

  528. God is active

  529. in the world.

  530. world.

  531. So,

  532. I'm just

  533. going to

  534. leave that,

  535. you know,

  536. we're going

  537. to just

  538. assume that

  539. as Christians.

  540. But how

  541. can we,

  542. how are we

  543. supposed to

  544. understand

  545. this activity,

  546. right?

  547. There's actually

  548. been a lot of

  549. discussion

  550. on these

  551. arguments

  552. with much

  553. of the

  554. talking

  555. surrounding

  556. it

  557. talking about

  558. what could

  559. or could not

  560. be a miracle.

  561. when are we

  562. talking about

  563. miracles,

  564. when are we

  565. talking about

  566. just regular

  567. activity?

  568. Is everything

  569. a miracle?

  570. Right?

  571. Some Christians

  572. would argue

  573. yes,

  574. right?

  575. There is no

  576. such thing

  577. as like a

  578. natural law

  579. that has

  580. its own

  581. abilities,

  582. its own

  583. functions,

  584. it has

  585. ingrained

  586. causal

  587. abilities.

  588. Everything

  589. is God's

  590. active

  591. activity.

  592. So,

  593. in a sense,

  594. everything is

  595. a miracle,

  596. right?

  597. The fact

  598. that the

  599. laws of

  600. nature

  601. are in

  602. force

  603. is because

  604. not that there

  605. is such a

  606. thing as

  607. the law

  608. of nature,

  609. only because

  610. God is

  611. doing

  612. the thing

  613. that we

  614. as scientists

  615. observe and

  616. say,

  617. okay,

  618. this is a

  619. regular thing,

  620. we're going

  621. to call

  622. this the

  623. law of

  624. nature,

  625. right?

  626. Now,

  627. there has

  628. been

  629. disagreement.

  630. Evangelical

  631. Christians

  632. generally

  633. arrive at

  634. a picture

  635. that separates

  636. God's

  637. ordinary

  638. providence

  639. God

  640. working

  641. through

  642. secondary

  643. causation,

  644. this is

  645. God's

  646. sort of

  647. what I

  648. was just

  649. describing,

  650. sustaining

  651. the world

  652. and its

  653. regularities

  654. and existence,

  655. right?

  656. And we

  657. have a lot

  658. of biblical

  659. evidence that

  660. this is what

  661. God does,

  662. okay?

  663. So,

  664. pretty much

  665. everybody agrees

  666. on this

  667. point,

  668. right?

  669. That God

  670. does sustain

  671. the way

  672. that the

  673. world works,

  674. right?

  675. Nothing

  676. that came

  677. into being

  678. would come

  679. into being

  680. without God

  681. and Jesus

  682. sustaining it,

  683. upholding the

  684. world,

  685. as it were,

  686. right?

  687. And so

  688. the idea

  689. of ordinary

  690. providence

  691. is that

  692. God,

  693. in his

  694. foreknowledge

  695. and in

  696. his power,

  697. creates

  698. things or

  699. sustains

  700. things using

  701. secondary

  702. causes,

  703. right?

  704. So he

  705. creates,

  706. for instance,

  707. physical

  708. things that

  709. have certain

  710. properties ingrained

  711. in the physical

  712. things that

  713. behave with

  714. the laws of

  715. nature in a

  716. certain way,

  717. right?

  718. Does that make

  719. sense?

  720. So,

  721. in a sense,

  722. so maybe a

  723. way of

  724. understanding

  725. ordinary

  726. providence is

  727. to say that

  728. when God

  729. says that

  730. he knit

  731. you in

  732. your mother's

  733. womb,

  734. he was being

  735. honest,

  736. right?

  737. But we

  738. also know

  739. how,

  740. you know,

  741. kids,

  742. look away

  743. from the

  744. thing,

  745. how egg

  746. and sperm

  747. work,

  748. right?

  749. How embryonic

  750. development

  751. works,

  752. how placental

  753. biology

  754. works,

  755. right?

  756. We know all

  757. that stuff.

  758. I mean,

  759. you will

  760. eventually.

  761. So,

  762. we know how

  763. that works,

  764. but at the

  765. same time,

  766. we also

  767. understand that

  768. it is God's

  769. sustaining work

  770. that maintains

  771. the pregnancy.

  772. It is God

  773. active in the

  774. secondary causes

  775. that makes the

  776. pregnancy work,

  777. and this is

  778. throughout all

  779. of Scripture,

  780. right?

  781. The birth of

  782. Isaac,

  783. the birth of

  784. John the

  785. Baptist.

  786. These are all

  787. instances where

  788. the people in

  789. these situations

  790. attribute the

  791. pregnancy to

  792. God's direct

  793. activity,

  794. but it

  795. wasn't a

  796. virgin birth

  797. or a virgin

  798. conception like

  799. Jesus,

  800. right?

  801. You know,

  802. the husband and

  803. wife really did

  804. love each other,

  805. right?

  806. So that's a way

  807. of understanding

  808. ordinary providence,

  809. which all

  810. Christians affirm.

  811. But there is

  812. an idea of

  813. what's called

  814. extraordinary

  815. providence,

  816. which is God's

  817. primary activity

  818. in the world.

  819. And so how

  820. can we understand

  821. extraordinary

  822. providence?

  823. This is describing

  824. God's work in

  825. history that

  826. extends beyond

  827. the regular

  828. activity in the

  829. world, which

  830. would include

  831. what we would

  832. call miracles,

  833. right?

  834. So we all

  835. understand how

  836. a baby is

  837. conceived and

  838. born, but we

  839. don't understand

  840. how, based

  841. on just

  842. secondary

  843. causation,

  844. water can

  845. turn into

  846. wine.

  847. Does that

  848. make sense?

  849. So this is

  850. an activity.

  851. Water, in

  852. general, doesn't

  853. turn into

  854. wine, right?

  855. You usually

  856. need some

  857. grapes and

  858. some thyme,

  859. et cetera,

  860. right?

  861. But this

  862. isn't to say

  863. that God

  864. necessarily

  865. disappeared

  866. the water

  867. and then

  868. reappeared

  869. wine in

  870. its place.

  871. He transformed

  872. water into

  873. wine without

  874. using the

  875. normal natural

  876. processes,

  877. right?

  878. He uses

  879. primary causation

  880. in some way.

  881. And the

  882. reason we

  883. call miracles

  884. miracles is

  885. because they

  886. go beyond

  887. the normal

  888. activity of

  889. the world,

  890. right?

  891. You know,

  892. basically

  893. resurrections

  894. are astounding

  895. because dead

  896. people have

  897. a propensity

  898. to stay

  899. dead, right?

  900. In our

  901. normal

  902. experience.

  903. Now, there

  904. actually is a

  905. lot of

  906. discussion,

  907. you know,

  908. does this

  909. require God

  910. to break

  911. his own

  912. laws,

  913. right?

  914. This is a

  915. long-standing

  916. argument among

  917. philosophers of

  918. religion.

  919. In fact,

  920. this very

  921. question is

  922. one of the

  923. driving forces.

  924. In the first

  925. class, we

  926. talked about

  927. the fundamentalist

  928. modernist

  929. divide,

  930. right?

  931. Where there's

  932. a lot of

  933. philosophical

  934. arguments going

  935. on, and

  936. one of them

  937. was among

  938. modernists,

  939. the argument

  940. that extraordinary

  941. providence is

  942. impossible,

  943. right?

  944. Extraordinary

  945. providence is

  946. impossible because

  947. this would

  948. require God

  949. to break

  950. his own

  951. laws, and

  952. that's an

  953. inconsistency in

  954. his character,

  955. right?

  956. Now, of

  957. course, if you

  958. follow that

  959. logically down

  960. the slide,

  961. then you

  962. stop believing

  963. in the virgin

  964. birth, you

  965. stop believing

  966. in the

  967. miracles of

  968. Jesus, the

  969. resurrection of

  970. Jesus, and

  971. this is how a

  972. lot of the

  973. theologians,

  974. such as

  975. Bultman,

  976. slid into

  977. agnosticism,

  978. if not outright

  979. atheism,

  980. because if

  981. you argue

  982. that there

  983. is no

  984. such thing

  985. as a

  986. possibility

  987. of such

  988. a thing

  989. as a

  990. miracle,

  991. then you

  992. come up

  993. against those

  994. miracles in

  995. the Bible,

  996. right?

  997. So, now

  998. the argument

  999. is, so

  1000. most Orthodox

  1001. Christians really

  1002. aren't arguing

  1003. at this level,

  1004. we're usually

  1005. arguing at the

  1006. next level,

  1007. which is,

  1008. when is it

  1009. appropriate for

  1010. us to appeal

  1011. to an

  1012. ordinary versus

  1013. an extraordinary

  1014. called providence,

  1015. right?

  1016. And so, like I

  1017. said before,

  1018. some Christians

  1019. would argue that

  1020. everything is

  1021. extraordinary

  1022. providence,

  1023. right?

  1024. God is doing

  1025. everything actively

  1026. all the time,

  1027. not in a

  1028. sustaining way

  1029. using secondary

  1030. causation, but

  1031. in a primary

  1032. way, right?

  1033. That's one way

  1034. of understanding

  1035. it.

  1036. But, generally,

  1037. that is not,

  1038. that is,

  1039. that is not

  1040. really going to

  1041. be playing a

  1042. major role

  1043. in the sort

  1044. of evolution,

  1045. theistic evolution,

  1046. intelligent design

  1047. arguments,

  1048. right?

  1049. Although that

  1050. is a part,

  1051. so, you know,

  1052. if you're going

  1053. to be reading

  1054. the literature,

  1055. this is going

  1056. to come up.

  1057. So, but

  1058. basically,

  1059. when it comes

  1060. down to the

  1061. science of faith

  1062. discussion,

  1063. you really get

  1064. generally two

  1065. groups, right?

  1066. You get one,

  1067. you get your,

  1068. what I'm calling

  1069. providential

  1070. creationists,

  1071. which, after

  1072. having made

  1073. the PowerPoint

  1074. and all the

  1075. outlines, I

  1076. realized that I

  1077. used providence

  1078. in a different

  1079. way, just like

  1080. a slide ago.

  1081. Anyways, I was

  1082. too lazy to

  1083. redo everything.

  1084. So, I'm going

  1085. to call them

  1086. providential

  1087. creationists, but

  1088. this is basically

  1089. the argument that

  1090. God universally,

  1091. in creation,

  1092. is using secondary

  1093. causation.

  1094. He's using ordinary

  1095. providence, right?

  1096. So, God

  1097. imbued

  1098. nature with

  1099. certain properties

  1100. that is capable

  1101. of bringing to

  1102. fruition that

  1103. which he wants

  1104. to come to

  1105. fruition, okay?

  1106. In creation.

  1107. Generally, this

  1108. also is,

  1109. this also comes

  1110. with, or is a

  1111. result from,

  1112. a high confidence

  1113. in science's

  1114. ability to explain

  1115. all phenomena,

  1116. right?

  1117. So, we, you

  1118. know, we live

  1119. in a time where

  1120. science is able

  1121. to explain a

  1122. whole bunch of

  1123. different things.

  1124. And so, in the

  1125. minds of scientists

  1126. and non-scientists

  1127. alike, there is

  1128. this view that

  1129. given enough time

  1130. and enough effort,

  1131. all phenomena

  1132. that we see or

  1133. can observe can

  1134. be explained,

  1135. can be interpreted

  1136. in some sort of

  1137. naturalistic way or

  1138. in a way that

  1139. comes down to

  1140. natural things

  1141. doing natural

  1142. things resulting

  1143. in natural

  1144. things, right?

  1145. So, this is that

  1146. mechanism, that's

  1147. that assumption

  1148. of methodological

  1149. naturalism, right?

  1150. Which assumes

  1151. that in science

  1152. we're going to be

  1153. talking only about

  1154. natural causes

  1155. doing natural

  1156. things, right?

  1157. And so, if science

  1158. has made a lot of

  1159. inroads using this

  1160. assumption of

  1161. methodological

  1162. naturalism, which

  1163. again, is not like

  1164. in the bylaws of

  1165. science, but it is

  1166. philosophically an

  1167. assumption, then

  1168. maybe that will

  1169. just continue

  1170. forever and

  1171. we'll get

  1172. everything pretty

  1173. timed in.

  1174. Yeah, Ivor?

  1175. Does this put

  1176. aside God's

  1177. sovereignty?

  1178. mean, he has to

  1179. abide by certain

  1180. rules.

  1181. If he's a

  1182. sovereign of the

  1183. universe, he can

  1184. do whatever he

  1185. wants.

  1186. In principle, yes.

  1187. But the argument

  1188. they would argue

  1189. is that

  1190. God in his

  1191. foreknowledge

  1192. created materials

  1193. that in his

  1194. sovereignty would

  1195. bring to fruition

  1196. what he wanted

  1197. to bring, right?

  1198. So it's not like

  1199. he's restricting

  1200. himself.

  1201. They're saying

  1202. God is front

  1203. loading in his

  1204. creation everything

  1205. that's necessary

  1206. to bring what he

  1207. wants to bring,

  1208. right?

  1209. There's nothing

  1210. lacking in nature

  1211. to do what God

  1212. wants it to do.

  1213. Does that make

  1214. sense?

  1215. It's a sort of a

  1216. best...

  1217. In a sense, it's

  1218. limiting God with

  1219. that explanation.

  1220. I mean, that's a

  1221. way of understanding

  1222. it.

  1223. I think they would

  1224. argue that that is

  1225. a reverse...

  1226. They would argue

  1227. that that's...

  1228. What you're saying

  1229. is a limitation of

  1230. God because what

  1231. you're saying is

  1232. that God couldn't

  1233. create something

  1234. that could do what

  1235. he wants it to do.

  1236. He would have to

  1237. actively intervene,

  1238. right?

  1239. I'm not saying that

  1240. that's a very...

  1241. I'm not saying that

  1242. that's the correct

  1243. argument.

  1244. Yeah, I mean,

  1245. right.

  1246. It's a philosophical

  1247. disagreement, right?

  1248. And it's going to

  1249. come down to batting

  1250. back and forth in

  1251. that way.

  1252. So along with

  1253. science's ability

  1254. to explain information

  1255. or the phenomena,

  1256. there's also sort of

  1257. an assumption of a

  1258. causally closed

  1259. universe.

  1260. If you're a

  1261. philosophy-minded

  1262. person, basically

  1263. that means that

  1264. everything is in a

  1265. chain of cause and

  1266. effect and that

  1267. that chain of cause

  1268. and effect can't be

  1269. broken.

  1270. Anyways, if you're

  1271. interested in that,

  1272. you can ask the

  1273. question afterwards.

  1274. That's problematic.

  1275. It is problematic.

  1276. So Orthodox

  1277. Christians will

  1278. acknowledge that

  1279. extraordinary providence

  1280. is a thing, but

  1281. they tend to

  1282. restrict this to

  1283. what they would

  1284. consider theologically

  1285. important situations,

  1286. right?

  1287. So they would say,

  1288. oh yeah, to be an

  1289. Orthodox Christian,

  1290. you have to believe in

  1291. the virgin birth of

  1292. Jesus Christ and his

  1293. resurrection.

  1294. These are miracles.

  1295. These are instances

  1296. of extraordinary

  1297. providence, but

  1298. these are occurring

  1299. because God has a

  1300. human audience that

  1301. he is then trying to

  1302. give theological

  1303. information to,

  1304. right?

  1305. And in creation, we

  1306. don't have that

  1307. argument.

  1308. That's their argument.

  1309. The next group is

  1310. what I'm calling

  1311. designing creationists,

  1312. which again, I'm

  1313. actually not very

  1314. happy with that idea.

  1315. Yeah.

  1316. Lay down,

  1317. Amos.

  1318. Question on the

  1319. last slide.

  1320. Yeah.

  1321. How does quantum

  1322. mechanics play a role

  1323. in these arguments

  1324. where there are

  1325. phenomena that don't

  1326. have?

  1327. How's that?

  1328. Yeah.

  1329. So that's a great

  1330. question.

  1331. In fact, in Alvin

  1332. Plantaga's book,

  1333. Where the Conflict

  1334. Really Lies, he's

  1335. going to argue that

  1336. a causally closed

  1337. universe is

  1338. scientifically, well,

  1339. philosophically

  1340. unwarranted,

  1341. scientifically unwarranted,

  1342. and now, given our

  1343. understanding of quantum

  1344. mechanics, doesn't

  1345. really make any sense

  1346. because we're not

  1347. talking about strict

  1348. cause and effect,

  1349. we're talking about

  1350. probabilities of

  1351. effect.

  1352. There are some

  1353. arguments against

  1354. that.

  1355. I don't have enough

  1356. time to go into

  1357. how some

  1358. interpretations of

  1359. quantum mechanics

  1360. result in

  1361. potentially a still

  1362. causally closed

  1363. universe.

  1364. They would argue

  1365. that the particles

  1366. themselves, while

  1367. acting unpredictably,

  1368. have their own

  1369. causally determined

  1370. properties that are

  1371. then resulting in

  1372. what we would call

  1373. unpredictability,

  1374. which on that

  1375. back end is not

  1376. actually unpredictable.

  1377. Those are very

  1378. in the multiverse

  1379. direction, right?

  1380. Yeah, I mean, they

  1381. go multiverse, or

  1382. they're going to

  1383. argue about

  1384. different fundamental

  1385. properties of the

  1386. particles themselves,

  1387. and how the

  1388. particles themselves

  1389. are then, how

  1390. they come into

  1391. being, right?

  1392. So you can imagine

  1393. a situation when you

  1394. have a chain of

  1395. cause and effect

  1396. that produces this

  1397. particle that then

  1398. has unpredictable

  1399. properties that, on

  1400. the macro scale,

  1401. events in phenomena

  1402. that are then

  1403. understandable under

  1404. cause and effect.

  1405. So they would

  1406. bring the causally

  1407. closeness back

  1408. words.

  1409. Does that make

  1410. sense?

  1411. If it doesn't make

  1412. sense, it's because

  1413. it barely makes

  1414. sense to me.

  1415. But moving on,

  1416. we got designing

  1417. creationists.

  1418. I like that question

  1419. that Amos, by the

  1420. way.

  1421. Designing

  1422. creationists, as you

  1423. might imagine,

  1424. believe that God

  1425. creates through a

  1426. combination of

  1427. primary and

  1428. secondary causation.

  1429. And we're talking

  1430. about creation

  1431. here, right?

  1432. Because I just

  1433. mentioned, Orthodox

  1434. Christians who are

  1435. of the providential

  1436. stripe will acknowledge

  1437. extraordinary stuff, but

  1438. only in really

  1439. theological situations,

  1440. right?

  1441. But designing

  1442. creationists are more

  1443. comfortable with God

  1444. having primary and

  1445. secondary causation in

  1446. creation.

  1447. Usually, this is

  1448. accompanied with a

  1449. less sanguine

  1450. outlook on what

  1451. science could

  1452. ultimately predict.

  1453. They would believe

  1454. that science will

  1455. not be able to

  1456. explain all

  1457. phenomena.

  1458. And therefore,

  1459. they would also

  1460. posit a causally

  1461. unclosed universe.

  1462. But again, the

  1463. philosophy of that is

  1464. weird.

  1465. But anyways, they

  1466. would say that they

  1467. would be looking for

  1468. recognizable signs of

  1469. God's activity in

  1470. nature because they're

  1471. going to be open to

  1472. primary causation in

  1473. creation if not

  1474. looking for it.

  1475. And Orthodox

  1476. Christians of this

  1477. position, they also

  1478. will affirm ordinary

  1479. providence and how

  1480. important it has been

  1481. in history.

  1482. They just don't think

  1483. it's the whole

  1484. McCoy.

  1485. It's not the whole

  1486. picture.

  1487. So, with that

  1488. background in mind,

  1489. just keep those two

  1490. groups sort of in

  1491. your mind.

  1492. I mean, it's pretty

  1493. obvious how they

  1494. cash out in the

  1495. theistic evolution

  1496. versus Intel

  1497. design argument.

  1498. But it is going to

  1499. be interesting, I

  1500. think, at the end

  1501. to bring it all

  1502. home to what I

  1503. think is this

  1504. disagreement about

  1505. what does it mean

  1506. for God to be

  1507. active in creation.

  1508. So, let's talk

  1509. about theistic

  1510. evolution.

  1511. I'm going to

  1512. give an overview

  1513. of how theistic

  1514. evolution arguments

  1515. generally work.

  1516. And then I'm going

  1517. to give two

  1518. arguments.

  1519. I'm looking at the

  1520. time.

  1521. I'm going to give

  1522. two arguments for

  1523. theistic evolution.

  1524. And then I'm going

  1525. to go over what

  1526. are usually the

  1527. general critiques of

  1528. the view.

  1529. And then I'm going

  1530. to do the same for

  1531. intelligent design.

  1532. And then I'm going

  1533. to close.

  1534. So, we're going to

  1535. go quick.

  1536. All right.

  1537. So, what is the

  1538. basic form of a

  1539. theistic evolutionary

  1540. argument?

  1541. I'm going to call

  1542. it TE just to save

  1543. my mouth.

  1544. So, baseline, as we

  1545. talked about on

  1546. class one, they're

  1547. going to assume the

  1548. verifiable truth of

  1549. macroevolution.

  1550. Okay?

  1551. So, just, that's

  1552. that.

  1553. So, we're not really

  1554. going to try to

  1555. think about it not

  1556. being true.

  1557. They're going to

  1558. assume that it's

  1559. true.

  1560. Okay?

  1561. So, if we go back

  1562. to our thoughts of

  1563. scientific reasoning,

  1564. they accept the

  1565. interpretations of

  1566. the data output of

  1567. a variety of

  1568. different sources,

  1569. anthropology,

  1570. paleontology,

  1571. biology, geology.

  1572. Anyways, therefore,

  1573. usually the argument

  1574. comes in two

  1575. propositions,

  1576. generally.

  1577. Right?

  1578. The propositions are,

  1579. one, the evolutionary

  1580. interpretation of the

  1581. science is true, and

  1582. two, the biblical

  1583. account is also true.

  1584. Right?

  1585. So, these two, this is

  1586. the basic form of the

  1587. argument, right?

  1588. Not all of their

  1589. arguments are for these

  1590. specific propositions,

  1591. but that's generally

  1592. how it goes.

  1593. So, usually, when you

  1594. read TE literature,

  1595. you're going to be

  1596. looking at two

  1597. specific elements of

  1598. evolutionary thinking

  1599. paired with a

  1600. specific overlap area

  1601. of theology.

  1602. So, for instance, to

  1603. give an example,

  1604. you know, proposition

  1605. one could be evolution

  1606. of humanity is true

  1607. versus proposition

  1608. two, man was made in

  1609. the image of God.

  1610. Okay?

  1611. Those both are true.

  1612. The TE position is

  1613. now I'm going to

  1614. explain why that can

  1615. be true.

  1616. Does that make sense?

  1617. So, you know, just

  1618. plug in any

  1619. evolutionary

  1620. interpretation in here,

  1621. plug in any

  1622. biblical interpretation

  1623. here that you think

  1624. are going to overlap

  1625. and then your argument

  1626. is these are going to

  1627. be coherent.

  1628. Okay?

  1629. Somehow.

  1630. Right?

  1631. And then the specifics

  1632. of how that works is

  1633. going to depend on the

  1634. specific argument being

  1635. made and how they make

  1636. that argument, obviously.

  1637. So, I don't have time to

  1638. go through a lot of

  1639. these different arguments.

  1640. arguments.

  1641. I want to give you two

  1642. high-level arguments.

  1643. Oh, I already said that.

  1644. Okay.

  1645. So, just imagine that I'm

  1646. saying it again.

  1647. And they're going to work

  1648. about philosophically,

  1649. theologically.

  1650. Again, right?

  1651. Because it's not a

  1652. scientific position, TE.

  1653. It is a philosophical,

  1654. theological position.

  1655. Right?

  1656. So, the concert of

  1657. these two propositions

  1658. is going to come down

  1659. to the philosophy,

  1660. interpretation, etc.

  1661. So, I want to give

  1662. two big-picture arguments.

  1663. These two big-picture

  1664. arguments, I think,

  1665. give us an understanding

  1666. of the macro-level

  1667. argument for the big

  1668. picture of evolution

  1669. and the big picture

  1670. of scripture.

  1671. Right?

  1672. So, these are going to

  1673. basically come down to

  1674. evolution occurred

  1675. and two, God created

  1676. the world.

  1677. Right?

  1678. So, these are the two

  1679. propositions that I'm

  1680. going to be dealing with

  1681. with two different kinds

  1682. of arguments.

  1683. And then, just to give

  1684. you a flavor about how

  1685. this cashes out,

  1686. and then we're going to

  1687. talk about criticisms.

  1688. Again, the breadth

  1689. of this position is so

  1690. wide that you're going

  1691. to find people who

  1692. will argue these two

  1693. propositions in

  1694. completely different

  1695. ways.

  1696. And then they're going

  1697. to argue with each

  1698. other over how your

  1699. solution to this

  1700. problem, or this

  1701. coherence, is wrong,

  1702. but mine is right.

  1703. Okay?

  1704. So, I'm not pretending

  1705. to sort of present

  1706. this is the unified

  1707. front of theistic

  1708. evolution.

  1709. In fact, probably the

  1710. two arguments I'm going

  1711. to put forward

  1712. forward, they're not

  1713. mutually exclusive,

  1714. but the people who

  1715. would argue for one or

  1716. the other probably

  1717. wouldn't agree with

  1718. each other.

  1719. So, anyways, again,

  1720. that's just the nature

  1721. of this position.

  1722. So, the first one is

  1723. going to be pretty

  1724. hard, and it's going

  1725. to be dry.

  1726. So, prepare yourself.

  1727. This is a philosophical

  1728. argument.

  1729. Okay?

  1730. So, and I've tried to

  1731. boil it down, but again,

  1732. there's an entire book

  1733. on it.

  1734. So, the book you're

  1735. going to want to read

  1736. if you want more on

  1737. this is Where the

  1738. Conflict Really Lies

  1739. with Alvin Plantinga,

  1740. where he famously

  1741. puts forward this

  1742. argument.

  1743. So, this is how the

  1744. argument goes.

  1745. Humans have cognitive

  1746. faculties such as

  1747. memory, perception,

  1748. intuition, introspection,

  1749. testimony, sympathy,

  1750. moral sense, etc.

  1751. You can go along the

  1752. lines, and we all

  1753. intuitively understand

  1754. our cognitive faculties

  1755. to be mostly reliable.

  1756. Right?

  1757. We believe that our

  1758. memories are able to

  1759. give us reliable

  1760. information, if not

  1761. perfect information.

  1762. We believe that our

  1763. ability to perceive the

  1764. world is perceiving a

  1765. real world.

  1766. It's not an imaginary

  1767. world.

  1768. Right?

  1769. We make predictions

  1770. based on these.

  1771. Our intuition about

  1772. logic, mathematics,

  1773. these are what we

  1774. consider to be reliable.

  1775. Our introspection about

  1776. our own mental states,

  1777. our own thoughts and

  1778. feelings, we believe is

  1779. reliable, etc.

  1780. We can learn from

  1781. testimony from other

  1782. people to teach us

  1783. things.

  1784. Now, here's where it

  1785. gets complicated.

  1786. Naturalism, which I'm

  1787. going to call N because

  1788. I didn't have space on

  1789. the slide to keep on

  1790. writing naturalism.

  1791. Naturalism N posits

  1792. that these faculties are

  1793. merely neurophysiological

  1794. properties.

  1795. Okay?

  1796. Now, depending on how

  1797. you make the argument

  1798. from materialism, you're

  1799. going to either be a

  1800. reductive or an irreductive

  1801. unreductive?

  1802. Nonreductive.

  1803. That's the one.

  1804. Some prefix reductive

  1805. materialist, right?

  1806. You're going to be

  1807. arguing either that the

  1808. mental, the cognitive

  1809. faculties are

  1810. neurophysiological

  1811. properties or that they

  1812. are neurophysiological

  1813. properties that also

  1814. unrelatedly produce a

  1815. mental state that has

  1816. some sort of content.

  1817. Again, there's an entire

  1818. book.

  1819. Read it.

  1820. For the time being,

  1821. naturalism posits

  1822. faculties are merely

  1823. neurophysiological

  1824. properties.

  1825. Okay?

  1826. That's one.

  1827. Two, evolution, which

  1828. I'm calling E, does not

  1829. select for faculties that

  1830. are true.

  1831. They select for only

  1832. advantageous behaviors.

  1833. Right?

  1834. Evolution doesn't care

  1835. whether you think that

  1836. your mental states or

  1837. that your ability to

  1838. remember five seconds

  1839. ago is true.

  1840. They only care that you

  1841. don't do stuff that's

  1842. going to get you killed.

  1843. Does that make sense?

  1844. Right?

  1845. So you could believe

  1846. anything.

  1847. You could believe that

  1848. everything in the whole

  1849. world is purple.

  1850. Right?

  1851. But as long as you eat,

  1852. as long as you reproduce,

  1853. as long as you survive and

  1854. are able to function,

  1855. you're going to be doing

  1856. well in life.

  1857. Okay?

  1858. This is a well-known

  1859. effect of evolution that

  1860. it only selects for

  1861. functional behavior.

  1862. It does not select for

  1863. content.

  1864. Right?

  1865. So, this is where it

  1866. gets confusing, but

  1867. follow with me.

  1868. If naturalism and

  1869. evolution are both true,

  1870. then we have good reason

  1871. to believe that our

  1872. mental faculties are not

  1873. reliable.

  1874. Because there are

  1875. neurophysiological

  1876. properties that are only

  1877. selected based on their

  1878. fitness.

  1879. They're not selected based

  1880. on their connection to

  1881. reality.

  1882. Right?

  1883. How close your

  1884. neurophysiological properties

  1885. are to a quote-unquote

  1886. truth is unrelated to how

  1887. they're going to affect

  1888. your fitness in the

  1889. evolutionary process.

  1890. That's the argument.

  1891. So, if both

  1892. naturalism and evolution

  1893. are both true, and we

  1894. have good reason to

  1895. believe that, to doubt

  1896. our own cognitive

  1897. faculties, then that

  1898. means that we have a

  1899. reason to doubt our

  1900. understanding that

  1901. naturalism and evolution

  1902. are true, or any

  1903. proposition is true.

  1904. Therefore, if naturalism

  1905. and evolution are both

  1906. true, then we have a good

  1907. reason to believe that

  1908. they are both not true.

  1909. Does that make sense?

  1910. Sort of.

  1911. Does that make sense?

  1912. Again, this is an

  1913. argument.

  1914. Right?

  1915. So, this isn't a given.

  1916. Alvin Plantinga is arguing

  1917. that this is true.

  1918. So, if you read his book,

  1919. he's going to argue for the

  1920. fact that naturalism posits

  1921. neurophysiological

  1922. properties.

  1923. He's going to argue that

  1924. evolution does not select

  1925. for true cognitive

  1926. faculties, only faculties that

  1927. are advantageous

  1928. behaviorally.

  1929. right?

  1930. I find his arguments

  1931. persuasive.

  1932. You may not, but this is

  1933. how the argument goes.

  1934. Right?

  1935. Does that make sense to

  1936. everybody?

  1937. How if evolution is both,

  1938. if naturalism and evolution

  1939. are both true, then naturalism

  1940. and evolution are both

  1941. false.

  1942. Does that make sense?

  1943. So, how does the theistic

  1944. evolution get in here?

  1945. Sorry, go ahead.

  1946. Before you even went on to

  1947. your second statement there,

  1948. it says evolution does not

  1949. select for faculties that are

  1950. true, only those that

  1951. produce advantageous

  1952. behaviors.

  1953. You could have stopped

  1954. right there and I would

  1955. have said, oh yeah,

  1956. that's totally contradictory.

  1957. Yes.

  1958. Yeah.

  1959. But, remember, this is a

  1960. philosopher.

  1961. He can't stop there.

  1962. He's got to go, he's got to

  1963. have at least nine different

  1964. parts to his syllogism.

  1965. Otherwise, other philosophers

  1966. will say, hey.

  1967. Sorry, yeah.

  1968. I just wanted to, it's not

  1969. just Alvin Plantinga, right?

  1970. Like, this is a very common

  1971. old argument.

  1972. I remember C.S. Lewis

  1973. making this argument and it

  1974. comes up a lot.

  1975. I love you, Tom.

  1976. This is, okay.

  1977. Watch this, okay?

  1978. Check this out.

  1979. You're predictive.

  1980. Okay.

  1981. So, this is the basis of the

  1982. argument, right?

  1983. So, now, based on this

  1984. argument, you can argue

  1985. either naturalism is true and

  1986. evolution is false or

  1987. evolution is true and

  1988. naturalism is false.

  1989. Does that make sense?

  1990. You can't have them both

  1991. together based on this

  1992. argument.

  1993. Now, since theistic

  1994. evolution assumes the

  1995. truth of evolution, right?

  1996. We already argued that.

  1997. We didn't argue that.

  1998. I just posited that.

  1999. That's the truth.

  2000. This argument necessitates

  2001. the fact that naturalism is

  2002. false.

  2003. Therefore, some sort of

  2004. theism, some naturalism is

  2005. not true.

  2006. Therefore, most likely theism

  2007. is true.

  2008. Does that make sense?

  2009. How evolution, the truth of

  2010. evolution could lead

  2011. philosophically to the belief

  2012. that God must exist in some

  2013. sense, right?

  2014. So, as Tom pointed out, this

  2015. is actually a formal way of

  2016. articulating C.S.

  2017. Lewis's own intuitive

  2018. disagreement with naturalistic

  2019. evolution, in which basically

  2020. he was saying that if we're

  2021. just a collection of atoms

  2022. bumping in the night, then why

  2023. should we care at all what two

  2024. atoms rubbing together think?

  2025. Right?

  2026. So, if you're arguing for

  2027. naturalistic evolution to me, in

  2028. which you're saying that I'm just

  2029. a collection, an interesting

  2030. collection of atoms altogether,

  2031. and you're in a different

  2032. interesting collection of atoms

  2033. altogether, his argument is,

  2034. why do I have to listen to

  2035. your atoms?

  2036. Right?

  2037. It undermines the bases of

  2038. rational thinking.

  2039. Okay.

  2040. That's argument one.

  2041. Again, there are arguments for

  2042. it.

  2043. The next argument for theistic

  2044. evolution I'm going to present is

  2045. what I call the fine-tuning in

  2046. convergent evolution argument.

  2047. So, in evolutionary theory, there is a

  2048. phenomenon known as convergence.

  2049. What is convergence?

  2050. Well, I'll tell you.

  2051. Convergence is where genetically and

  2052. historically isolated populations give

  2053. rise to animals, to functions that are

  2054. very eerily similar.

  2055. Okay?

  2056. So, we can look at the macro scale and

  2057. say, we got wolves here who look very

  2058. wolf-like.

  2059. We have hyenas here who also are looking

  2060. pretty similar.

  2061. And we also have what is now an extinct

  2062. organism, the Tasmanian tiger, which I

  2063. think should be called the Tasmanian

  2064. wolf, but whatever.

  2065. So, you have three different groups.

  2066. Right?

  2067. And maybe you're thinking on the

  2068. evolutionary paradigm they are closely

  2069. related and therefore, you know, they're

  2070. just modifications of each other.

  2071. Well, in fact, if you use the genetics,

  2072. phylogenetically, which is a fancy way of

  2073. saying evolutionary relationship between

  2074. these three is actually very distant.

  2075. Okay?

  2076. They're not actually related.

  2077. Well, I mean, if you take universal

  2078. common ancestry, everything is related.

  2079. Right?

  2080. But that's not the point.

  2081. What I'm pointing out is that

  2082. evolutionarily they're not in the same

  2083. tree.

  2084. They're on a different branch.

  2085. Right?

  2086. But they look incredibly similar and they

  2087. do exactly the same job in their

  2088. environments.

  2089. And their environments are not

  2090. particularly similar.

  2091. You know, the Tasmanian dude, he's

  2092. living out in Australia, which is not

  2093. known for being the same as Northwest.

  2094. Right?

  2095. I mean, I've never been to Australia.

  2096. I'm sure it's very nice.

  2097. I mean, unless you like Australia, which

  2098. Northwest is not very nice.

  2099. Anyways.

  2100. And then you have the hyena, which is

  2101. living in a different environment.

  2102. And so the argument is this phenomenon

  2103. that everybody, all evolutionists, will

  2104. acknowledge this is something that has

  2105. happened.

  2106. Right?

  2107. It's not in controversy that these three

  2108. different species are unrelated, although

  2109. they look very similar and do very similar

  2110. things.

  2111. And this isn't the only example I could

  2112. give.

  2113. I could give examples of different sort of

  2114. functions, sort of echolocation.

  2115. Right?

  2116. Echolocation is a very rare way of hunting,

  2117. but there's a whole bunch of different

  2118. unrelated organisms in evolutionary theory

  2119. have developed echolocation in their own

  2120. way, like bats and whales and not whales.

  2121. I think there's bug.

  2122. There's some kind of bug that does it, too.

  2123. What's up?

  2124. Well, no, that's not right.

  2125. I don't even know.

  2126. I don't know.

  2127. I am a biologist.

  2128. I don't even know what I'm talking about.

  2129. Okay.

  2130. So based on these observations, a theistic

  2131. evolutionary advocate will argue that

  2132. evolution isn't as random as is proposed by

  2133. materialists.

  2134. And in fact, while the mechanism of

  2135. evolution is in one sense random because

  2136. of the mutations and the natural selection,

  2137. there seems to be some sort of fine-tuning

  2138. of the whole process, some sort of

  2139. constraint on the whole process that

  2140. produces specific animal forms consistently.

  2141. And this would be very unlikely on

  2142. naturalism if it were to be true.

  2143. Right?

  2144. On naturalism, you would expect evolution to

  2145. be very contingent, which is another way of

  2146. saying a very random, historically

  2147. unpredictable situation.

  2148. But on convergent evolution, it seems like

  2149. no matter where you are, things, the

  2150. evolutionary process sort of gives you the

  2151. same results in a way, depending on no

  2152. matter where you go.

  2153. Right?

  2154. And so the TE advocate would argue that this

  2155. implies that evolution had us in mind, which

  2156. is harmonious with belief in God and it's less

  2157. likely based on theism.

  2158. Whew.

  2159. Okay.

  2160. Does everybody understand that?

  2161. Make sense?

  2162. Okay.

  2163. Let's move on to general critiques of theistic

  2164. evolution.

  2165. evolution.

  2166. The first of which, and again, the TE group is

  2167. very broad.

  2168. Right?

  2169. So, you know, there are people within the

  2170. group who are very orthodox.

  2171. There are people in the group who are not as

  2172. orthodox.

  2173. What the general critique of it is, is that it, as a

  2174. worldview, depending on how much of the

  2175. interpretations of the data and the corresponding

  2176. worldview that you accept leaks into your

  2177. theology.

  2178. Right?

  2179. So, examples of this.

  2180. TE advocates often argue that human beings

  2181. didn't originate from a single population.

  2182. Some do, some don't.

  2183. But this can undermine human uniqueness.

  2184. Another way of, another group may posit that

  2185. Adam and Eve didn't exist in any sense, which

  2186. produces theological problems in a variety of

  2187. different ways.

  2188. It's not intractable theological problems, but

  2189. it's not, it's, it's, it does provide some

  2190. issues.

  2191. Right?

  2192. Additionally, many have challenged the idea of

  2193. original innocence, that human beings were made

  2194. morally good or morally innocent, which, in

  2195. contrast, sort of undermines the entire idea of the

  2196. doctrine of original sin.

  2197. In some ways, it would argue against a fall, which

  2198. would then give us the doctrine of original sin.

  2199. And concomitantly, you often get TE advocates that will

  2200. argue for an alternative atonement than

  2201. substitutionary atonement, which is the, the, the,

  2202. basically the gospel as understood by evangelicals.

  2203. Right?

  2204. Is substitutionary atonement.

  2205. Not that there are other atonements aren't in

  2206. activity, but in the gospel, substitutionary

  2207. atonement plays a major part.

  2208. Right?

  2209. And then, maybe you would argue that this is an

  2210. unfair criticism of theistic evolution because

  2211. there have been different arguments for atonement in

  2212. the entire history of Christianity.

  2213. And I would argue that that's true.

  2214. Although, basically there are two major themes in

  2215. Orthodox Christianity for atonement.

  2216. In the Western side, we have substitutionary

  2217. atonement.

  2218. On the Eastern side, we have kenosis.

  2219. Am I doing that right, Tom?

  2220. Is that unrelated?

  2221. Okay.

  2222. I mean, it's similar.

  2223. Yeah.

  2224. So.

  2225. Ancestral sin instead of original sin.

  2226. Right.

  2227. Right.

  2228. And then the idea is not that God is here to, to

  2229. atone for moral sins, law-breaking, but to

  2230. atone for death by introducing life.

  2231. If you want to learn more about that, Athanasius.

  2232. Yes.

  2233. Can you clarify what's meant by original

  2234. innocence?

  2235. Since we wouldn't describe sin to a lion eating the

  2236. buffalo that it finds.

  2237. Yeah.

  2238. So they would argue that, that modern humans, as we

  2239. understand them, were never innocent.

  2240. Right?

  2241. Different strains of...

  2242. What does the word innocent mean?

  2243. So the word innocent means that they, they had

  2244. not sinned until the fall, basically.

  2245. So there were, they did nothing morally evil until

  2246. the fall occurred, which introduced in original

  2247. sin.

  2248. Right?

  2249. So in an evolutionary and some assessments of, of

  2250. the evolution of humanity, you're going to get

  2251. modern humans, you know, killing and other

  2252. untoward things, other human beings.

  2253. And that is an important or essential part in the

  2254. history of the evolution of humanity.

  2255. Right?

  2256. And so depending on how, where you place humanity,

  2257. right?

  2258. Because that is an open question in evolutionary

  2259. arguments.

  2260. At what point do hominins become modern humans?

  2261. And there's a whole debate over that.

  2262. And it's not very clear.

  2263. But depending on where you fall on that, on the

  2264. theistic evolutionary side, that's going to depend,

  2265. determine whether or not you believe that there was

  2266. such a thing as original innocence.

  2267. Whether human beings were ever made morally

  2268. innocent.

  2269. Does that make sense?

  2270. Right?

  2271. So does that exclude sin as a possibility?

  2272. Or does that just mean that we were always pretty

  2273. messed up?

  2274. Yeah.

  2275. So that would argue that we were pretty messed up

  2276. from the beginning.

  2277. Right?

  2278. That's the kind of argument I'm talking about here.

  2279. Now there are other kinds of arguments that say

  2280. in some sense sin had been influencing the evolutionary

  2281. process.

  2282. And so the story of Genesis is really an argument about

  2283. how that sin in the process of nature affected human

  2284. beings, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

  2285. Right?

  2286. Is there any sense where like, oh yeah, the devil, he came in

  2287. and messed things up?

  2288. That's a very common position.

  2289. Well, I wouldn't say very common, but it is a common

  2290. position.

  2291. But that's not even restricted to theistic evolutionists,

  2292. actually.

  2293. That's also a creationist position, depending on the group,

  2294. who argue that, so for instance, if you're an old earth

  2295. creationist, you're going to be more open to the idea of the

  2296. devil influencing the history of the world in which you get

  2297. extinctions and et cetera.

  2298. Right?

  2299. Again, depending on what kind of old earth creationist you are.

  2300. This next one, potentially enhancing the problem of evil,

  2301. depending on, again, the TE argument you make.

  2302. On some formulations of TE, the world as it is now is the way

  2303. it should be.

  2304. Right?

  2305. There has been no cataclysmic sort of fall.

  2306. The evolutionary process as it works today, as we imagine it

  2307. working backwards in time, is the way that God meant it to be.

  2308. Right?

  2309. So that implies that natural evil, and possibly even moral evil of

  2310. human beings, depending on whether you believe there was original

  2311. innocence in human beings, are part of God's good creation.

  2312. Right?

  2313. Now, a TE advocate would say, well, theistic evolution suffers from the

  2314. problem of evil like everybody else does.

  2315. And they suffer in many of the same ways as old earth creationism does.

  2316. But in this specific way, there is a difference, because many in the

  2317. creationist camps would argue that in some sense the fall of human beings,

  2318. if not the fall of creation, depending on how you understand that, has affected the

  2319. way that nature works.

  2320. And so if you were to study nature now and extrapolate backwards, you would get a bad

  2321. picture of history.

  2322. As opposed to the TE argument, often, which says, no, we get an accurate picture of the

  2323. way history was.

  2324. That's just good, in a sense.

  2325. Does that make sense?

  2326. And so now, this leads to very interesting and possibly problematic views of atonement.

  2327. So if we're talking about alternate views of atonement, based on this understanding of

  2328. the problem of evil, this version of atonement imagines that the crucifixion of Jesus in God

  2329. is God, in some sense, taking responsibility for his creation by entering into our suffering.

  2330. Right?

  2331. He says, God's good creation creates this suffering in this TE argument.

  2332. And in the crucifixion, God is not staying separate.

  2333. He is entering into the suffering of creation as a way of taking responsibility for his creative

  2334. act, which I think can lead to a variety of theological problems.

  2335. Yeah, lay it on me.

  2336. I know we've got to move on, but just real quick, would this idea that the nature of

  2337. the way it should be, which includes natural or moral evil, being good, does that lend itself

  2338. to sort of like moral progressivism?

  2339. Like, well, we just need to keep getting better and better until, you know, we fix everything.

  2340. Yeah, I mean, that is one way of doing it, is one way of understanding it.

  2341. The problem is, and I think that's a legitimate argument, the problem is, how do we score

  2342. that view with the view of scripture?

  2343. Right?

  2344. Right.

  2345. Yeah.

  2346. So, I mean, that's my point about it being a theological problem.

  2347. Right.

  2348. Because, I mean, many of the TE arguments make logical sense and philosophical sense.

  2349. The problem is, if we're thinking about the biblical theology that we get based on our

  2350. last class with Nick and my good friend Tyler, how do you get those streams, how do you get

  2351. those storylines, those narratives in the Bible, if that's what's going on?

  2352. Right.

  2353. Okay.

  2354. Okay.

  2355. I'm going to get to the arguments of intelligent design, and I'm going to fly through them,

  2356. because we can't leave the building after 1025.

  2357. Okay.

  2358. Basics of ID arguments.

  2359. So, in the same sense that I outlined how TE arguments go, I'm going to argue how ID

  2360. arguments go.

  2361. ID arguments can come in two streams.

  2362. And, again, they're scientific arguments, as they would construe them.

  2363. So, they're going to use scientific evidence to posit design in nature in two different

  2364. ways.

  2365. They can use negative arguments.

  2366. Negative arguments means that they seek to make naturalistic explanations of scientific

  2367. data, the data output that we talked about earlier, make those naturalistic interpretations

  2368. less likely, and on average make theism more likely.

  2369. Positive arguments that provide empirical evidence that suggests that design is more likely.

  2370. You see how that works?

  2371. There's sort of mirror images of each other, but there is a difference.

  2372. Right?

  2373. To say, this naturalistic mechanism is not likely, is not the same as saying, this phenomenon that

  2374. we see gives me evidence of design.

  2375. Does that make sense?

  2376. I think there's a place for both of them.

  2377. I think they both have their own potential flaws.

  2378. But, either form of this argument is going to be using the inductive interpretative scientific

  2379. method in history called inference to the best explanation.

  2380. Right?

  2381. So, in the historical sciences, you have a phenomenon that you're trying to explain.

  2382. What you do is you fan out a whole variety of different hypotheses of what could explain

  2383. this.

  2384. And, inference to the best explanation is the interpretative method in which you say, how

  2385. do you decide between these different hypotheses?

  2386. Right?

  2387. And so, ID arguments trade on this form of reasoning to argue that, given a variety of hypotheses

  2388. for a specific phenomenon, the inference to the best explanation is going to give us

  2389. some sort of design.

  2390. Some sort of intelligent agency.

  2391. So, I'm not going to give you negative arguments, because I think that they have their own issues

  2392. that are, and they're less interesting.

  2393. So, maybe two positive arguments.

  2394. I'm going to focus on two arguments that are often used.

  2395. These are sort of the bread and butter, you might say, of the ID position.

  2396. And these different arguments can actually be applied to different fields in different ways.

  2397. So, I'm going to be focusing on the biochemistry side of things, because that's what I do, or

  2398. that's what I've done, or, I don't know.

  2399. That's not who I am, but, you know, you get my point.

  2400. I'm a biochemist.

  2401. I guess I am a biochemist.

  2402. What am I, what am I, I'm not fooling myself.

  2403. Okay.

  2404. So, the first argument is going to be complex specified information in DNA.

  2405. Okay.

  2406. So, what are we talking about when we say complex specified information?

  2407. Well, according to information theory, there are two components that can modify what we

  2408. call information and give it different properties.

  2409. Okay.

  2410. These two, as you might guess, are complexity, which describes the improbability of a configuration

  2411. or sequence of characters.

  2412. Specificity, which is a configuration fitting to an independent pattern that conveys meaning.

  2413. Okay.

  2414. You can have a complex information that's not specific.

  2415. You can have specific information that's not complex.

  2416. And you can also have complex specified information.

  2417. Okay.

  2418. What does that look like?

  2419. This is very complex.

  2420. In this understanding of complex.

  2421. Okay.

  2422. I just literally took my keyboard and went, okay.

  2423. But, so you say it's random.

  2424. Complexity and randomness are not in opposition.

  2425. Right.

  2426. When we say complexity, we mean the likelihood, if we're doing probabilities, the likelihood of

  2427. this sequence of characters is very, very low.

  2428. It's very improbable.

  2429. Right.

  2430. Because how many letters are other than the alphabet?

  2431. I'm really asking.

  2432. I totally forget.

  2433. 26.

  2434. Okay.

  2435. Okay.

  2436. How many sections are there in the sequence?

  2437. We got, you know, I'm not going to do the math.

  2438. But anyways, for every position of here, there's a, the likelihood is 1 to the 26 that you're

  2439. going to get this one compounded across the section.

  2440. It's very improbable.

  2441. It's the same thing as looking at a giant pile of rocks and saying the likelihood that they

  2442. landed in exactly that position is very low.

  2443. Right.

  2444. Right.

  2445. You couldn't, probability wise, you couldn't place them in that order to try to get that

  2446. configuration.

  2447. Right.

  2448. It's just astronomically hard to do.

  2449. The next example is specified information.

  2450. This means something to us.

  2451. Right.

  2452. Two.

  2453. It corresponds to a preexisting standard that we can apply to.

  2454. Right.

  2455. Two.

  2456. We know it's a word.

  2457. It means something.

  2458. Right.

  2459. Two.

  2460. I'm not going to describe it.

  2461. Anyways, you guys get it.

  2462. Two.

  2463. But it's specified, but it's not complex.

  2464. Right.

  2465. The, the likelihood of a T being next to an O are actually not that hard given randomness.

  2466. Right.

  2467. You're just kind of like, you know, if you're, I don't know if you've ever been bored at

  2468. the computer trying to write and you just do this, you're going to get T twos.

  2469. You're going to get thes.

  2470. You're going to get wees.

  2471. Right.

  2472. Very short sequences that correspond to what we would call a separate thing.

  2473. Right.

  2474. Now, complex specified information is information that is both complex and specified.

  2475. Right.

  2476. It's very unlikely to get this sequence in a row if you're just playing on your computer.

  2477. And also, if you see this sequence in a row, it means something to you.

  2478. Right.

  2479. Right.

  2480. It is not just random stuff in a row.

  2481. You're like, oh, I get information from that.

  2482. Right.

  2483. So how does this go into ID?

  2484. When information is both complex and specified, it is universally the product of intelligence.

  2485. Complex specified information does not occur under this understanding from random processes.

  2486. At the very least, at the base, you're going to find intelligence as the, as the result of it.

  2487. So DNA, this argument goes, contains complex specified information in the form of nucleotide triplets that serve to represent amino acids and protein coding sequences.

  2488. Right.

  2489. And this isn't an analogy.

  2490. This is actually true.

  2491. The triplets, the sequences in DNA form triplets.

  2492. And these triplets have no physiological connection to each other.

  2493. There's no necessary reason why these three should be next to each other or why the chemistry of these three makes a difference.

  2494. Right.

  2495. So the sequence is, is complex.

  2496. Right.

  2497. And it's specified because these specific nucleotides next to each other mean glutamine.

  2498. Right.

  2499. So based on this argument, therefore, inferring to the best explanation.

  2500. Right.

  2501. That's the way that ID arguments work.

  2502. Inferring to the best explanation, DNA originates from intelligent agency because given hypotheses, different hypotheses for the origin of DNA.

  2503. The likelihood of there being complex specified information outside of intelligence is low.

  2504. But the existence of complex specified information on intelligence is very high.

  2505. So if you're going to choose between them, intelligence design, intelligence is the best explanation.

  2506. Right.

  2507. What's that I hear?

  2508. Yes.

  2509. This does reject methodological naturalism.

  2510. Right.

  2511. If you're on methodological naturalism, intelligent agency is not a possibility.

  2512. Not a possible hypothesis.

  2513. So now among the non-intelligent group, you're going to have to choose between those options about what's the most likely hypothesis.

  2514. Right.

  2515. But if we understood, remember from section one or class one, methodological naturalism is not necessary to science.

  2516. So if you reject that assertion and include intelligent agency into the possible hypotheses, that is the best explanation.

  2517. Okay.

  2518. Okay.

  2519. Irreducible complexity of a biochemical, biomechanical machine, I should say.

  2520. So what is irreducible complexity?

  2521. Okay.

  2522. The way to understand irreducible complexity is it's a quality in a system where that system is dependent on multiple independent parts that produce a single function.

  2523. Where each part has no function separate from the parts in the whole.

  2524. Okay.

  2525. Classic example is the mousetrap.

  2526. I know it's old and everybody does it, but it's a good example just to get our heads around the idea.

  2527. Right.

  2528. Each of these different components together is necessary for the mousetrap to do its single function, which is, unfortunately, to trap the mouse.

  2529. Or fortunately, depending if you have a mouse problem.

  2530. I lived in a house with a mouse problem.

  2531. We never used mousetraps, but at a certain point you start to be like, okay, they ate my lazy boy chair.

  2532. I'm getting close to throwing mousetraps everywhere.

  2533. Anyways, so this piece right here is meant to release once the cheese is disturbed, which is going to release this piece, which is going to go forward because of the spring, which is then attached to the base.

  2534. And every one of these parts is necessary for the mousetrap to do its function, but separately they don't do anything by themselves.

  2535. Okay.

  2536. So, how is this an argument for ID?

  2537. There are examples of irreducibly complex systems in biology by argument, such as multiprotein complexes.

  2538. So, for instance, you've got your ATP synthase.

  2539. Right?

  2540. Everybody knows what that is.

  2541. Right?

  2542. Of course.

  2543. No, but ATP synthase is a motor that when stimulated by protons moving across a gradient, biologists, you know what I'm talking about.

  2544. Basically, it spins and it can convert low energy molecules into high energy molecules.

  2545. And these high energy molecules are what is necessary for biology to happen.

  2546. Right?

  2547. Because we're very unlikely, cells are very unlikely states of entropy and you need high energy to get them from.

  2548. Anyways, I'm going through too much information here.

  2549. But anyways, it's a very complex machine.

  2550. Each of these different parts does its own thing.

  2551. Separate from the machine, separate from the whole, these different parts don't do anything.

  2552. Right?

  2553. They don't produce a function such as converting something from low energy to high energy.

  2554. Right?

  2555. So, another example is the famous flagellum.

  2556. It's a motor, spins the thing to let the bacteria move along.

  2557. Okay?

  2558. I'm not going to spend a whole lot of time on that.

  2559. Because it's not necessary for the argument.

  2560. All that needs to be true for the argument to be true is that each of these different components are necessary altogether to produce a function.

  2561. And without one of these different components, the function would not occur in any sense.

  2562. Okay.

  2563. Irradiably complex systems are impossible to produce in a step-by-step Darwinian mechanism.

  2564. As each component in the right order are all necessary to function, but they have no independent function.

  2565. So, if you imagine the Darwinian mechanism as normally understood, each step in the mutation selection system is selecting for function.

  2566. Right?

  2567. That's what selection is separating.

  2568. But you cannot produce a step-by-step machine that only functions when all the steps are together.

  2569. Does that make sense?

  2570. So, to step-by-step add each part to the system, you need to have foresight that the end product is going to be functionally helpful.

  2571. But natural selection is unguided, does not have that foresight, and therefore cannot produce irreducibly complex systems.

  2572. Okay?

  2573. Therefore, intelligence agents, but we know that intelligence agents are capable of producing irreducibly complex systems.

  2574. We invented the mousetrap.

  2575. Right?

  2576. It's not like we were sitting around, and we had all these different parts, and we're like, oh, you know.

  2577. No.

  2578. We knew when we put together the mousetrap, not us specifically, but human beings, intelligent agents knew what they were trying to produce.

  2579. Therefore, inferring to the best explanation, irreducibly complex systems are the result of intelligent agency.

  2580. Again, spread out the hypotheses, pick the one that makes the most sense.

  2581. That's the idea for an intelligent design argument.

  2582. Okay.

  2583. Moving on to general critiques.

  2584. I'm flying through them.

  2585. I know, I'm sure we all could think of objections to any different parts of all these different arguments.

  2586. I'm trying to put forward the arguments as stated.

  2587. So, one of the general critiques of intelligent design is the God of the gaps fallacy,

  2588. which essentially states that when we don't know what happened, we just insert God into the system,

  2589. and that is the best explanation at that point because all the other explanations are very bad.

  2590. Right?

  2591. And this is actually, this criticism is valid when the gap is due to ignorance.

  2592. However, the argument goes, there are gaps that are not due to ignorance.

  2593. Potentially.

  2594. Potentially.

  2595. Or are there.

  2596. Are all gaps due to ignorance.

  2597. Second, tension in creationism should be floating in your mind when I ask you that question, right?

  2598. Whether we decide whether there's a gap of ignorance or not.

  2599. Second, we got bad theology.

  2600. Okay?

  2601. This criticism comes in many different forms.

  2602. One form says that by arguing for the apparent design of different features of nature,

  2603. ID proponents are actually creating a dichotomy between that which God has created and that which he has not created.

  2604. Right?

  2605. And as Christians, we believe that God has created everything.

  2606. So this creates sort of a bad dichotomy in theology for the activity of God.

  2607. Another critique is to imply that God did not create a world that was sufficient for his purposes.

  2608. God needed to intervene.

  2609. And doesn't that mean that God was an ineffective creator if he has to intervene in his creation to institute a change that he wants?

  2610. Couldn't he have just front-loaded everything?

  2611. Isn't he powerful enough to do that?

  2612. And finally, this is actually sort of a heavy philosophical argument.

  2613. So if you're into that kind of thing, get ready.

  2614. So there's an argument that ID assumes the mechanistic nature of the modern view of the universe.

  2615. And therefore, by God creating in the way that ID proponents argue, that makes God into a too-imminent anthropomorphic sort of deity.

  2616. If that doesn't make any sense to you, it's probably because you're not Catholic.

  2617. Okay.

  2618. As opposed to transcendent and other?

  2619. As opposed to, yes, transcendent, other.

  2620. This argument is usually put forward by classical theists who argue that God is not imminent in the way that we are imminent.

  2621. In the sense that he doesn't work the way that we work.

  2622. To impose ideas on God based on our own activity is to anthropomorphize God.

  2623. Okay.

  2624. Okay.

  2625. Summing up.

  2626. We got through it.

  2627. Technically, almost 15 minutes over.

  2628. So, how does second tension in creationism help us understand these different views?

  2629. Right?

  2630. If you're a providential creationist, they're not going to find any ID arguments convincing.

  2631. Because a priori, meaning before the fact, God is asserted to work through secondary causation.

  2632. Based on this view, you're not going to find any gaps that are not due to ignorance.

  2633. Right?

  2634. The other kind of gap we could talk about would be a gap due to the nature of the cause.

  2635. Right?

  2636. Sort of a gap between water and wine.

  2637. We know water doesn't turn into wine.

  2638. Right?

  2639. There's a gap due to the nature of the substance and the activity that it produces.

  2640. And so, to infer intelligent agency there is legitimate.

  2641. But in creation, a providential creationist is to say there is no gaps due to the nature.

  2642. There is a secondary causation that can cause everything.

  2643. Because God did use secondary causation to cause everything.

  2644. Does that make sense?

  2645. Okay.

  2646. A designing creationist is going to be more comfortable with ID.

  2647. Surprisingly.

  2648. I mean, not surprisingly.

  2649. And perhaps not feel the need to take what they would consider potential theological risks of TE.

  2650. Right?

  2651. If I'm comfortable with God doing primary causation in history,

  2652. I am not wedded to the specific interpretations of the data that is being produced.

  2653. Therefore, I can criticize the interpretation, put forward my own interpretation,

  2654. and that keeps me safe from these potentially theological problems.

  2655. Right?

  2656. You can imagine this actually makes dialogue between ID and TE advocates very difficult.

  2657. Right?

  2658. This second tension.

  2659. Right?

  2660. Because you're going to have an ID person arguing scientifically, no, here is a gap due to nature.

  2661. And you're going to have a TE person arguing, there are no such things as gaps due to nature.

  2662. Right?

  2663. Right?

  2664. So, hopefully after this, no matter where you are on either position,

  2665. you can at least understand how a Christian can come to this position,

  2666. why they come to this position,

  2667. and maybe argue for your position based on their own assumptions,

  2668. and try to convince them on that way,

  2669. as opposed to producing an argument based on your own assumptions,

  2670. which is probably not going to get anywhere.

  2671. Does that make sense?

  2672. Okay.

  2673. That was the goal of the whole class.

  2674. Okay.

  2675. Thank you.

  2676. That's it.

  2677. Alright.

  2678. Questions afterwards.

  2679. This is actually already over time.

  2680. But if you have a question, I'll answer it in the next five minutes.

  2681. Can I just reiterate, you need to go, leave in a car, do that now.

  2682. Yes.

  2683. Yes, because you have ten minutes to leave before the run starts.

  2684. Really, you should be leaving now to get out in time.

  2685. Leave now, as opposed to the station of second service.

  2686. Right.

  2687. That's right.

  2688. Yeah.

  2689. I'm saying to the second service, we're good.

  2690. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

  2691. Yeah.

  2692. Or if you want to hang around until 1115.

  2693. No, I just want to make sure.

  2694. See you, Tom.

  2695. Second service is good.

  2696. I was waiting to have a question.

  2697. Oh, you have a question.

  2698. Lay it on me.

  2699. I was going to ask about the providential creationists.

  2700. Yeah.

  2701. So, how are they materially or substantially different from deists?

  2702. If they think that God just set everything up from the beginning and everything is secondary

  2703. and that he doesn't interfere, he doesn't come in in a personal, imminent way, to me,

  2704. that's deism, right?

  2705. I mean, isn't that...

  2706. So, yeah, it depends on how you're going to argue for that.

  2707. Because some would argue that God, in his sustaining of nature, that is activity, right?

  2708. God is, through his will, sustaining the natural properties of these different things.

  2709. And therefore, their activity is ultimately a result of God's activity.

  2710. And to say that God is hands-off is not true.

  2711. He has to be hands-on.

  2712. Otherwise, everything falls apart.

  2713. I see.

  2714. Okay.

  2715. The other thing there is...

  2716. The providential creationists are just saying, in creation, God is just working through secondary causes.

  2717. He only steps in and does the miracle thing at theologically opportune times.

  2718. So, they're not being full-on deists.

  2719. You can think of it kind of as deists about the process of biological creation.

  2720. Okay.

  2721. And some would be comfortable with that assessment, being called deists for creation.

  2722. Others would be very... would be rankled, if you call them a deist on creation.

  2723. So, there is difference.

  2724. There are some who are like, oh, yeah, for sure.

  2725. I'm a deist, essentially, until it comes into history, right?

  2726. Yeah.

  2727. Any other questions?

  2728. Lay it on me.

  2729. Maybe this is a sticking point about the imminent versus transcendent argument.

  2730. And I know that's more of a theological and philosophical thing.

  2731. Oh, yeah.

  2732. Doesn't matter.

  2733. Doesn't mean it's not important.

  2734. Well, sure.

  2735. And maybe I just need to do more background, not research on that whole debate.

  2736. But doesn't the dual divine human nature of Jesus sort of help us with that supposed dichotomy?

  2737. Like, that God is both imminent and transcendent?

  2738. Yeah.

  2739. But they would argue, if you're a classical theist, that that is restricted to history.

  2740. So, post-incarnation, God in his humanity in Jesus, we can anthropomorphize.

  2741. Well, he is.

  2742. It's not anthropomorphizing.

  2743. He's human.

  2744. Right.

  2745. So, attributing human traits to Jesus is legitimate.

  2746. They would argue pre-incarnation to attribute human traits to God is to anthropomorphize him.

  2747. Before he's anthropomorphized in the ultimate sense.

  2748. Why is this a problem?

  2749. Well, that is a great question.

  2750. Why is it a problem?

  2751. It's based on the actual, your view of God.

  2752. Right.

  2753. So, on the classical theist position, you have divine simplicity, impassibility, and timelessness.

  2754. And these three together form a view of God in which God is transcendent.

  2755. And the creation is sort of a causal eminence of God.

  2756. And God is not changed by the creation.

  2757. That's the impassibility part.

  2758. Right.

  2759. God is not changed by his activity of creation.

  2760. Think of creation in this view.

  2761. Creation is like a shadow and God is the real thing.

  2762. Right.

  2763. The thing doesn't change because of the shadow.

  2764. Right.

  2765. Right.

  2766. And so, to say that God is fiddling with the shadow seems to assume that God is changing.

  2767. And that's not allowed.

  2768. Does that make sense?

  2769. Yeah.

  2770. Remind me just one more thing.

  2771. Remind me what a classical theist is again.

  2772. Yeah.

  2773. I'm getting lost in all the definitions today.

  2774. Yeah.

  2775. So, it depends on who you ask.

  2776. Classical theist could be another way of just saying I'm an orthodox Christian with a view of God.

  2777. But there's a term of art called classical theism which asserts the view of God as understood in the first couple centuries.

  2778. Well, I mean, in their credit, the first millennia or so of Christianity.

  2779. Right.

  2780. Which is to view God based on Aristotelian understandings of myriology and other, sorry, understandings of how parts work, what metaphysics is.

  2781. Basically, if you assume an Aristotelian metaphysic or a Platonic metaphysic, then you're going to be restricted to a classical theist God due to the nature of the way that reality works.

  2782. But, if you reject the classical metaphysic, then these problems go away.

  2783. So, does it just come down to God's in the ability then?

  2784. Yes.

  2785. So, in classical theism, God's aseity, his self-sufficiency requires that he be impassable and simple and timeless.

  2786. So, that's why they would require certain constraints when we're talking about creation.

  2787. Exactly.

  2788. Well, that's not true.

  2789. I mean, necessarily.

  2790. They would argue perhaps God imbued nature with the ability to create systems that look designed.

  2791. I mean, that...

  2792. Right?

  2793. That's kind of...

  2794. But, so they're not arguing necessarily for evolution or that it's completely secondary causation.

  2795. They're saying that the way that ID arguments work assumes a God that is tinkering.

  2796. And God, based on their assessment, cannot tinker.

  2797. Or will not tinker.

  2798. Or cannot tinker.

  2799. I don't know.

  2800. It's a very confusing argument.

  2801. So, if you can get a handle on it, tell me.

  2802. I just need a lot of books is what I'm getting at.

  2803. Yeah.

  2804. I mean, you need like a PhD level education in philosophy.

  2805. Yeah.

  2806. It's very difficult to understand.

  2807. All right.