Sermon
Shades of Creationism 3
Publisher transcript
Transcript
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Well, let us start up. Why don't we start with prayer.
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Father God, thank you for this day.
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Thank you for this opportunity that we can gather together and think about you.
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I ask, Lord, that this class would be edifying to the body,
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that we would glorify you with our interactions,
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and that we would be able to leave today with a better understanding of our fellow Christians.
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In Jesus' name, amen.
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Okay, so, as, you know, it's tradition now.
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Let's do preamble.
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So, the preamble today is basically can be summed up as, I'm inadequate.
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So, this is a very complicated discussion,
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and as I was preparing for today's class,
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I realized that I had to truncate a whole bunch of things
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to fit everything in that I wanted to fit in.
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And so, I guess what I want to say is that
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if a specific point that I'm making or argument that I'm making
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doesn't sound particularly persuasive in the way that I have articulated it,
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just know that there is an entire book on that argument that you can read
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that will most likely make more sense than the way I'm putting it together.
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Although, who knows? I mean, I don't know.
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Okay, so with that being said, let's start our final class today,
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which is going to actually start touching on what I've been hinting at in the subtitle,
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which is Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution.
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The last two classes, we've been dealing with sort of the historical background.
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What do I mean when I say Intelligent Design and Theistic Evolution?
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What kind of arguments are they making?
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Last class, we talked about how different biblical interpretations of Genesis
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can either leave room for or not leave room for evolutionary mechanisms,
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among many other things.
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And now we're going to deal with the positions themselves.
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But before we do that, I'd like to start with just a very simple crash course
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in scientific reasoning.
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Okay, so just as an explainer of how there can be differences of opinion
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when it comes to scientific information,
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and what does that even mean, right?
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And a question that was asked in the first class,
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or was it the second class?
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You know, they all rub together now.
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There was the question of, you know,
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how can we have different interpretations of science, essentially?
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And I want to explain a little bit about how that is.
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So how is science actually done, right?
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That is the question.
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Science is very fruitful.
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But it's not that science is something that does not require interpretation
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or other forms of communication.
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So as Christians, we believe in what is called the correspondence view of truth, right?
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Which means that for something to be true, it has to correspond to reality, right?
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So that is actually pretty straightforward.
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But I'm just going to posit that because all of the scientific reasoning
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that we are going to be talking about today,
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and a lot of the arguments flowing from that,
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are assuming this view of truth.
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That there is something real.
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There is something called reality.
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reality that when we understand it,
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we can gain knowledge that is true, right?
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And so in science, what we're trying to do
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is actually get a little piece of this reality,
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get a glimpse of it,
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using repetition, instrumentation,
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eliminating variables,
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among a whole host of other things, right?
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So if I was going to try to diagram it,
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it would look something like this.
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We have this thing called reality, right?
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It's real, you know, by definition.
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Here's this thing called reality.
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And in science, what we're trying to do
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is we're trying to observe
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some facet of this reality
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using instruments, often.
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You know, I mean, back in the day,
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they would just use their eyeballs.
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But I guess if you could, you know,
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in a certain sort of reductive way,
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call your eyeballs instruments, right?
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But yeah, we're going to be observing reality,
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some facet of reality.
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Based on this observation,
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this is going to give us some sort of data output, right?
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And this is what kind of output you get
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is going to be dependent
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what kind of instrument you're using
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and the way that you're trying to observe, right?
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Because, believe it or not,
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the observation itself
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is not necessarily the data output,
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although observation is a form of data, right?
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But oftentimes,
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the instrument is observing something
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and it tells us something
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about what it's observing, right?
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Finally, on top of this data output,
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we're going to be interpreting the output, right?
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So we get this number
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or this picture
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or this, you know,
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solution
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or pellet,
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whatever it is.
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We get some sort of output
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and on top of this output,
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we are going to be
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interpreting the data
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to make sense
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in what we already know
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about the world,
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to posit new facets
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of how the world is working
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based on the output you've gotten.
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And on top of this interpretation,
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we're now going to be building a worldview, right?
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So this is the layer,
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the layers of scientific reasoning, okay?
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And so
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in most scientific circles,
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this is sort of seen as a,
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unbreakable chain, right?
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The reality
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necessarily leads to,
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leads to the observation,
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which necessarily leads to this data output,
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which necessarily
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is interpreted correctly this way,
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which necessarily means
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in a big worldview sense,
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X, right?
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So,
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but is that necessarily true?
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Do we have to,
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is it an unbreakable chain?
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And, you know,
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people who,
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so I guess I should say
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maybe the popular view of science
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is that this is an unbreakable chain,
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right?
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People who are actually doing science
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know that,
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you know,
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these chains are often
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very, very weak.
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And so,
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oftentimes,
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a lot of what we're trying to do
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is
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determine how,
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you know,
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how can we reliably say
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that this X equals this,
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right?
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So,
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what's the Christian's responsibility
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in all of this,
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right?
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So,
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we've talked over the last few classes
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about the fact that
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Scripture being our highest authority,
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we were committed to the claims of Scripture,
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but also Scripture testifies
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to the reliability
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of what we can learn from nature,
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right?
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And because we affirm
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Scripture,
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we,
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in some sense,
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Christians are responsible
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for the realities of nature.
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So,
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at a very base level,
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Christians are responsible
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to the truth of this,
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right?
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This thing here,
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reality,
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is real,
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right?
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And Christians have to affirm that
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at the very least,
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right?
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Secondly,
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I would say,
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to a lesser extent,
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Christians are,
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have to be,
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by way of being intellectually honest,
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we have to at least
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affirm
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the observations
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with the instruments
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and the data
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that the instruments put out,
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right?
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Now,
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the reason I say
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to a lesser extent
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is because
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these observations
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with instruments
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are not the reality themselves.
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These are ways
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of getting at the reality
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and scientists know
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depending on the instrument
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you use,
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the reality may look different.
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Depending on
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the way that you use
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the instrument,
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the data output
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might be different,
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right?
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And so,
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these are
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extrapolations
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from the reality,
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but they're not
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the reality itself.
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So,
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I think,
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at the very least,
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Christians need
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to be able to say,
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yes,
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there is something real
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that scientists
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are observing
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or trying to observe
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that I,
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as a Christian,
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must say,
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that is true.
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Okay?
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If we think about
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our last class,
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this is where
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the differences
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between the philosophical
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views about
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balancing general
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and special revelation
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comes in
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because maybe
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you're thinking
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about the first group
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that I talked about
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which would be
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the science skeptics
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and the science skeptics
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would say,
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really,
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there is no way
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to get from reality
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to observations
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with instruments,
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right?
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I mean,
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like,
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they get stuff right
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sometimes,
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but there really
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isn't any consistent
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way to get at this,
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right?
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But I think
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most Christians
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would consider
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it their responsibility
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to affirm
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that there is
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a reality
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that is being
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observed with
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instruments
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and it is putting
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out some sort
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of information,
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okay?
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So,
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but,
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what about
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these next levels?
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The interpretation
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of output
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and the worldview
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based on Pata.
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Now,
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everybody,
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all Christians
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of all stripes,
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right,
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whether they be
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intelligent design
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advocates,
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theistic evolutionists,
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creationists,
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they are all
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going to say
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the worldview,
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the interpretation
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to worldview
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connection
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is not,
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is not something
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that we as Christians
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need to affirm
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and oftentimes
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we as Christians
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need to fight
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against that
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interpretation,
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right?
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Even a theistic
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evolutionist
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would be arguing
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that the scientific
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materialism
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that often results
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from the interpretations
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of the data
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is not warranted.
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It's a philosophical,
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metaphysical argument
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that is not,
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that is maybe
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is understandable
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in light of the data
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but is not required,
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right?
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And so,
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we would all argue,
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boom,
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this connection
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we as Christians
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can argue against
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and often should
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be arguing against
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of all stripes,
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right?
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obviously,
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as Christians
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we have to at least
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argue against
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scientific materialism,
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right?
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Otherwise,
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you know,
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that assumes
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there is no God,
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right?
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And as Christians
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that, you know,
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puts us in a weird
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position.
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So,
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now secondly,
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now this is where
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a lot of the
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disagreements come in
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between Christians.
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As I said before,
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most people would argue
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that the data output
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that comes out
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from our observations
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is something that
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we need to affirm
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is real in some sense,
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right?
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With qualifications,
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right?
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And scientists know
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all the qualifications,
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right?
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Everybody,
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I mean,
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I don't know
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about the other
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scientists in the room,
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but I do get annoyed
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when you read
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a scientific publication
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and then you read
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the news articles
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from the scientific
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publication,
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right?
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We've all had
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this experience
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in the scientific
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community where you're
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like,
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oh man,
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they did not get it.
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You know,
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they're not making
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the kinds of
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qualifications
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that are necessary
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to get at the
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accuracy of what's
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going on.
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Yeah,
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you could understand
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the data that they
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put out in the way
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that you're describing,
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but nobody would
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actually argue that
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that's actually
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what's going on.
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Okay?
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So,
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we're all familiar
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with that,
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but qualifications
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in mind,
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there are basically
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two different groups
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understanding
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how are we going
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to argue
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against this
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interpretation
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of output.
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There are Christians
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who say,
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this interpretation
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of output
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is very reliable,
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right?
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And then there
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are Christians
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who say,
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I am not required
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to accept this
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and I'm going
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to argue
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my own case
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against it
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based on the data,
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right?
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So,
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and this actually
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comes down
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to
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the second
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tension in creation
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as I've been
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talking about.
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But I guess I just
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want to get across
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in this section
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here that
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it's not just
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Christians who
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need to be
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skeptical about
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this chain of
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reasoning,
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right?
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And it's not just
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Christians who are
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skeptical.
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Scientists are
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often very
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critical of
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other scientists'
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interpretation of
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data,
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especially if
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your interpretation
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of your own
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data differs
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with their
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interpretation,
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right?
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That's when the
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gloves come off
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and the fighting
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really begins
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metaphorically.
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So,
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you know,
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hopefully metaphorically.
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So,
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yeah,
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we all argue
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about the
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interpretation of
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the data.
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The question is
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at what point
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should Christians
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affirm so-called
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consensus in
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the interpretation
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of the data?
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versus not,
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right?
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So,
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what's this
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second tension
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in creationism
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all about?
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Okay?
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So,
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the second tension
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in creationism
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I'm going to
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talk about
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has to do
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with God's
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activity,
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right?
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What is God's
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activity?
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How can we
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understand it?
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So,
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first of all,
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Christianity
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asserts
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that
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God is active
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in the world.
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world.
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So,
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I'm just
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going to
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leave that,
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you know,
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we're going
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to just
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assume that
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as Christians.
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But how
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can we,
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how are we
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supposed to
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understand
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this activity,
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right?
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There's actually
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been a lot of
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discussion
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on these
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arguments
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with much
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of the
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talking
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surrounding
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it
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talking about
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what could
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or could not
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be a miracle.
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when are we
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talking about
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miracles,
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when are we
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talking about
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just regular
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activity?
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Is everything
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a miracle?
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Right?
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Some Christians
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would argue
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yes,
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right?
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There is no
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such thing
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as like a
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natural law
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that has
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its own
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abilities,
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its own
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functions,
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it has
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ingrained
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causal
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abilities.
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Everything
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is God's
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active
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activity.
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So,
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in a sense,
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everything is
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a miracle,
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right?
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The fact
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that the
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laws of
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nature
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are in
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force
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is because
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not that there
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is such a
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thing as
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the law
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of nature,
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only because
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God is
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doing
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the thing
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that we
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as scientists
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observe and
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say,
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okay,
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this is a
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regular thing,
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we're going
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to call
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this the
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law of
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nature,
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right?
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Now,
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there has
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been
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disagreement.
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Evangelical
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Christians
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generally
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arrive at
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a picture
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that separates
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God's
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ordinary
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providence
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God
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working
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through
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secondary
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causation,
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this is
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God's
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sort of
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what I
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was just
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describing,
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sustaining
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the world
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and its
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regularities
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and existence,
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right?
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And we
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have a lot
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of biblical
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evidence that
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this is what
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God does,
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okay?
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So,
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pretty much
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everybody agrees
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on this
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point,
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right?
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That God
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does sustain
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the way
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that the
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world works,
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right?
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Nothing
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that came
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into being
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would come
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into being
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without God
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and Jesus
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sustaining it,
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upholding the
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world,
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as it were,
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right?
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And so
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the idea
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of ordinary
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providence
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is that
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God,
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in his
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foreknowledge
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and in
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his power,
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creates
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things or
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sustains
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things using
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secondary
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causes,
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right?
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So he
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creates,
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for instance,
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physical
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things that
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have certain
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properties ingrained
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in the physical
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things that
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behave with
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the laws of
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nature in a
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certain way,
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right?
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Does that make
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sense?
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So,
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in a sense,
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so maybe a
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way of
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understanding
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ordinary
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providence is
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to say that
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when God
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says that
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he knit
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you in
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your mother's
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womb,
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he was being
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honest,
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right?
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But we
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also know
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how,
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you know,
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kids,
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look away
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from the
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thing,
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how egg
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and sperm
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work,
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right?
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How embryonic
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development
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works,
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how placental
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biology
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works,
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right?
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We know all
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that stuff.
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I mean,
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you will
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eventually.
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So,
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we know how
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that works,
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but at the
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same time,
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we also
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understand that
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it is God's
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sustaining work
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that maintains
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the pregnancy.
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It is God
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active in the
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secondary causes
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that makes the
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pregnancy work,
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and this is
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throughout all
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of Scripture,
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right?
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The birth of
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Isaac,
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the birth of
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John the
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Baptist.
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These are all
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instances where
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the people in
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these situations
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attribute the
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pregnancy to
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God's direct
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activity,
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but it
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wasn't a
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virgin birth
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or a virgin
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conception like
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Jesus,
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right?
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You know,
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the husband and
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wife really did
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love each other,
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right?
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So that's a way
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of understanding
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ordinary providence,
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which all
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Christians affirm.
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But there is
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an idea of
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what's called
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extraordinary
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providence,
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which is God's
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primary activity
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in the world.
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And so how
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can we understand
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extraordinary
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providence?
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This is describing
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God's work in
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history that
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extends beyond
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the regular
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activity in the
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world, which
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would include
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what we would
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call miracles,
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right?
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So we all
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understand how
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a baby is
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conceived and
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born, but we
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don't understand
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how, based
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on just
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secondary
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causation,
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water can
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turn into
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wine.
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Does that
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make sense?
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So this is
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an activity.
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Water, in
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general, doesn't
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turn into
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wine, right?
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You usually
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need some
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grapes and
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some thyme,
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et cetera,
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right?
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But this
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isn't to say
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that God
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necessarily
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disappeared
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the water
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and then
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reappeared
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wine in
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its place.
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He transformed
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water into
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wine without
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using the
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normal natural
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processes,
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right?
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He uses
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primary causation
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in some way.
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And the
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reason we
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call miracles
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miracles is
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because they
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go beyond
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the normal
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activity of
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the world,
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right?
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You know,
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basically
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resurrections
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are astounding
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because dead
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people have
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a propensity
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to stay
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dead, right?
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In our
-
normal
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experience.
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Now, there
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actually is a
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lot of
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discussion,
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you know,
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does this
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require God
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to break
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his own
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laws,
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right?
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This is a
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long-standing
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argument among
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philosophers of
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religion.
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In fact,
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this very
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question is
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one of the
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driving forces.
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In the first
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class, we
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talked about
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the fundamentalist
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modernist
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divide,
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right?
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Where there's
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a lot of
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philosophical
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arguments going
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on, and
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one of them
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was among
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modernists,
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the argument
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that extraordinary
-
providence is
-
impossible,
-
right?
-
Extraordinary
-
providence is
-
impossible because
-
this would
-
require God
-
to break
-
his own
-
laws, and
-
that's an
-
inconsistency in
-
his character,
-
right?
-
Now, of
-
course, if you
-
follow that
-
logically down
-
the slide,
-
then you
-
stop believing
-
in the virgin
-
birth, you
-
stop believing
-
in the
-
miracles of
-
Jesus, the
-
resurrection of
-
Jesus, and
-
this is how a
-
lot of the
-
theologians,
-
such as
-
Bultman,
-
slid into
-
agnosticism,
-
if not outright
-
atheism,
-
because if
-
you argue
-
that there
-
is no
-
such thing
-
as a
-
possibility
-
of such
-
a thing
-
as a
-
miracle,
-
then you
-
come up
-
against those
-
miracles in
-
the Bible,
-
right?
-
So, now
-
the argument
-
is, so
-
most Orthodox
-
Christians really
-
aren't arguing
-
at this level,
-
we're usually
-
arguing at the
-
next level,
-
which is,
-
when is it
-
appropriate for
-
us to appeal
-
to an
-
ordinary versus
-
an extraordinary
-
called providence,
-
right?
-
And so, like I
-
said before,
-
some Christians
-
would argue that
-
everything is
-
extraordinary
-
providence,
-
right?
-
God is doing
-
everything actively
-
all the time,
-
not in a
-
sustaining way
-
using secondary
-
causation, but
-
in a primary
-
way, right?
-
That's one way
-
of understanding
-
it.
-
But, generally,
-
that is not,
-
that is,
-
that is not
-
really going to
-
be playing a
-
major role
-
in the sort
-
of evolution,
-
theistic evolution,
-
intelligent design
-
arguments,
-
right?
-
Although that
-
is a part,
-
so, you know,
-
if you're going
-
to be reading
-
the literature,
-
this is going
-
to come up.
-
So, but
-
basically,
-
when it comes
-
down to the
-
science of faith
-
discussion,
-
you really get
-
generally two
-
groups, right?
-
You get one,
-
you get your,
-
what I'm calling
-
providential
-
creationists,
-
which, after
-
having made
-
the PowerPoint
-
and all the
-
outlines, I
-
realized that I
-
used providence
-
in a different
-
way, just like
-
a slide ago.
-
Anyways, I was
-
too lazy to
-
redo everything.
-
So, I'm going
-
to call them
-
providential
-
creationists, but
-
this is basically
-
the argument that
-
God universally,
-
in creation,
-
is using secondary
-
causation.
-
He's using ordinary
-
providence, right?
-
So, God
-
imbued
-
nature with
-
certain properties
-
that is capable
-
of bringing to
-
fruition that
-
which he wants
-
to come to
-
fruition, okay?
-
In creation.
-
Generally, this
-
also is,
-
this also comes
-
with, or is a
-
result from,
-
a high confidence
-
in science's
-
ability to explain
-
all phenomena,
-
right?
-
So, we, you
-
know, we live
-
in a time where
-
science is able
-
to explain a
-
whole bunch of
-
different things.
-
And so, in the
-
minds of scientists
-
and non-scientists
-
alike, there is
-
this view that
-
given enough time
-
and enough effort,
-
all phenomena
-
that we see or
-
can observe can
-
be explained,
-
can be interpreted
-
in some sort of
-
naturalistic way or
-
in a way that
-
comes down to
-
natural things
-
doing natural
-
things resulting
-
in natural
-
things, right?
-
So, this is that
-
mechanism, that's
-
that assumption
-
of methodological
-
naturalism, right?
-
Which assumes
-
that in science
-
we're going to be
-
talking only about
-
natural causes
-
doing natural
-
things, right?
-
And so, if science
-
has made a lot of
-
inroads using this
-
assumption of
-
methodological
-
naturalism, which
-
again, is not like
-
in the bylaws of
-
science, but it is
-
philosophically an
-
assumption, then
-
maybe that will
-
just continue
-
forever and
-
we'll get
-
everything pretty
-
timed in.
-
Yeah, Ivor?
-
Does this put
-
aside God's
-
sovereignty?
-
mean, he has to
-
abide by certain
-
rules.
-
If he's a
-
sovereign of the
-
universe, he can
-
do whatever he
-
wants.
-
In principle, yes.
-
But the argument
-
they would argue
-
is that
-
God in his
-
foreknowledge
-
created materials
-
that in his
-
sovereignty would
-
bring to fruition
-
what he wanted
-
to bring, right?
-
So it's not like
-
he's restricting
-
himself.
-
They're saying
-
God is front
-
loading in his
-
creation everything
-
that's necessary
-
to bring what he
-
wants to bring,
-
right?
-
There's nothing
-
lacking in nature
-
to do what God
-
wants it to do.
-
Does that make
-
sense?
-
It's a sort of a
-
best...
-
In a sense, it's
-
limiting God with
-
that explanation.
-
I mean, that's a
-
way of understanding
-
it.
-
I think they would
-
argue that that is
-
a reverse...
-
They would argue
-
that that's...
-
What you're saying
-
is a limitation of
-
God because what
-
you're saying is
-
that God couldn't
-
create something
-
that could do what
-
he wants it to do.
-
He would have to
-
actively intervene,
-
right?
-
I'm not saying that
-
that's a very...
-
I'm not saying that
-
that's the correct
-
argument.
-
Yeah, I mean,
-
right.
-
It's a philosophical
-
disagreement, right?
-
And it's going to
-
come down to batting
-
back and forth in
-
that way.
-
So along with
-
science's ability
-
to explain information
-
or the phenomena,
-
there's also sort of
-
an assumption of a
-
causally closed
-
universe.
-
If you're a
-
philosophy-minded
-
person, basically
-
that means that
-
everything is in a
-
chain of cause and
-
effect and that
-
that chain of cause
-
and effect can't be
-
broken.
-
Anyways, if you're
-
interested in that,
-
you can ask the
-
question afterwards.
-
That's problematic.
-
It is problematic.
-
So Orthodox
-
Christians will
-
acknowledge that
-
extraordinary providence
-
is a thing, but
-
they tend to
-
restrict this to
-
what they would
-
consider theologically
-
important situations,
-
right?
-
So they would say,
-
oh yeah, to be an
-
Orthodox Christian,
-
you have to believe in
-
the virgin birth of
-
Jesus Christ and his
-
resurrection.
-
These are miracles.
-
These are instances
-
of extraordinary
-
providence, but
-
these are occurring
-
because God has a
-
human audience that
-
he is then trying to
-
give theological
-
information to,
-
right?
-
And in creation, we
-
don't have that
-
argument.
-
That's their argument.
-
The next group is
-
what I'm calling
-
designing creationists,
-
which again, I'm
-
actually not very
-
happy with that idea.
-
Yeah.
-
Lay down,
-
Amos.
-
Question on the
-
last slide.
-
Yeah.
-
How does quantum
-
mechanics play a role
-
in these arguments
-
where there are
-
phenomena that don't
-
have?
-
How's that?
-
Yeah.
-
So that's a great
-
question.
-
In fact, in Alvin
-
Plantaga's book,
-
Where the Conflict
-
Really Lies, he's
-
going to argue that
-
a causally closed
-
universe is
-
scientifically, well,
-
philosophically
-
unwarranted,
-
scientifically unwarranted,
-
and now, given our
-
understanding of quantum
-
mechanics, doesn't
-
really make any sense
-
because we're not
-
talking about strict
-
cause and effect,
-
we're talking about
-
probabilities of
-
effect.
-
There are some
-
arguments against
-
that.
-
I don't have enough
-
time to go into
-
how some
-
interpretations of
-
quantum mechanics
-
result in
-
potentially a still
-
causally closed
-
universe.
-
They would argue
-
that the particles
-
themselves, while
-
acting unpredictably,
-
have their own
-
causally determined
-
properties that are
-
then resulting in
-
what we would call
-
unpredictability,
-
which on that
-
back end is not
-
actually unpredictable.
-
Those are very
-
in the multiverse
-
direction, right?
-
Yeah, I mean, they
-
go multiverse, or
-
they're going to
-
argue about
-
different fundamental
-
properties of the
-
particles themselves,
-
and how the
-
particles themselves
-
are then, how
-
they come into
-
being, right?
-
So you can imagine
-
a situation when you
-
have a chain of
-
cause and effect
-
that produces this
-
particle that then
-
has unpredictable
-
properties that, on
-
the macro scale,
-
events in phenomena
-
that are then
-
understandable under
-
cause and effect.
-
So they would
-
bring the causally
-
closeness back
-
words.
-
Does that make
-
sense?
-
If it doesn't make
-
sense, it's because
-
it barely makes
-
sense to me.
-
But moving on,
-
we got designing
-
creationists.
-
I like that question
-
that Amos, by the
-
way.
-
Designing
-
creationists, as you
-
might imagine,
-
believe that God
-
creates through a
-
combination of
-
primary and
-
secondary causation.
-
And we're talking
-
about creation
-
here, right?
-
Because I just
-
mentioned, Orthodox
-
Christians who are
-
of the providential
-
stripe will acknowledge
-
extraordinary stuff, but
-
only in really
-
theological situations,
-
right?
-
But designing
-
creationists are more
-
comfortable with God
-
having primary and
-
secondary causation in
-
creation.
-
Usually, this is
-
accompanied with a
-
less sanguine
-
outlook on what
-
science could
-
ultimately predict.
-
They would believe
-
that science will
-
not be able to
-
explain all
-
phenomena.
-
And therefore,
-
they would also
-
posit a causally
-
unclosed universe.
-
But again, the
-
philosophy of that is
-
weird.
-
But anyways, they
-
would say that they
-
would be looking for
-
recognizable signs of
-
God's activity in
-
nature because they're
-
going to be open to
-
primary causation in
-
creation if not
-
looking for it.
-
And Orthodox
-
Christians of this
-
position, they also
-
will affirm ordinary
-
providence and how
-
important it has been
-
in history.
-
They just don't think
-
it's the whole
-
McCoy.
-
It's not the whole
-
picture.
-
So, with that
-
background in mind,
-
just keep those two
-
groups sort of in
-
your mind.
-
I mean, it's pretty
-
obvious how they
-
cash out in the
-
theistic evolution
-
versus Intel
-
design argument.
-
But it is going to
-
be interesting, I
-
think, at the end
-
to bring it all
-
home to what I
-
think is this
-
disagreement about
-
what does it mean
-
for God to be
-
active in creation.
-
So, let's talk
-
about theistic
-
evolution.
-
I'm going to
-
give an overview
-
of how theistic
-
evolution arguments
-
generally work.
-
And then I'm going
-
to give two
-
arguments.
-
I'm looking at the
-
time.
-
I'm going to give
-
two arguments for
-
theistic evolution.
-
And then I'm going
-
to go over what
-
are usually the
-
general critiques of
-
the view.
-
And then I'm going
-
to do the same for
-
intelligent design.
-
And then I'm going
-
to close.
-
So, we're going to
-
go quick.
-
All right.
-
So, what is the
-
basic form of a
-
theistic evolutionary
-
argument?
-
I'm going to call
-
it TE just to save
-
my mouth.
-
So, baseline, as we
-
talked about on
-
class one, they're
-
going to assume the
-
verifiable truth of
-
macroevolution.
-
Okay?
-
So, just, that's
-
that.
-
So, we're not really
-
going to try to
-
think about it not
-
being true.
-
They're going to
-
assume that it's
-
true.
-
Okay?
-
So, if we go back
-
to our thoughts of
-
scientific reasoning,
-
they accept the
-
interpretations of
-
the data output of
-
a variety of
-
different sources,
-
anthropology,
-
paleontology,
-
biology, geology.
-
Anyways, therefore,
-
usually the argument
-
comes in two
-
propositions,
-
generally.
-
Right?
-
The propositions are,
-
one, the evolutionary
-
interpretation of the
-
science is true, and
-
two, the biblical
-
account is also true.
-
Right?
-
So, these two, this is
-
the basic form of the
-
argument, right?
-
Not all of their
-
arguments are for these
-
specific propositions,
-
but that's generally
-
how it goes.
-
So, usually, when you
-
read TE literature,
-
you're going to be
-
looking at two
-
specific elements of
-
evolutionary thinking
-
paired with a
-
specific overlap area
-
of theology.
-
So, for instance, to
-
give an example,
-
you know, proposition
-
one could be evolution
-
of humanity is true
-
versus proposition
-
two, man was made in
-
the image of God.
-
Okay?
-
Those both are true.
-
The TE position is
-
now I'm going to
-
explain why that can
-
be true.
-
Does that make sense?
-
So, you know, just
-
plug in any
-
evolutionary
-
interpretation in here,
-
plug in any
-
biblical interpretation
-
here that you think
-
are going to overlap
-
and then your argument
-
is these are going to
-
be coherent.
-
Okay?
-
Somehow.
-
Right?
-
And then the specifics
-
of how that works is
-
going to depend on the
-
specific argument being
-
made and how they make
-
that argument, obviously.
-
So, I don't have time to
-
go through a lot of
-
these different arguments.
-
arguments.
-
I want to give you two
-
high-level arguments.
-
Oh, I already said that.
-
Okay.
-
So, just imagine that I'm
-
saying it again.
-
And they're going to work
-
about philosophically,
-
theologically.
-
Again, right?
-
Because it's not a
-
scientific position, TE.
-
It is a philosophical,
-
theological position.
-
Right?
-
So, the concert of
-
these two propositions
-
is going to come down
-
to the philosophy,
-
interpretation, etc.
-
So, I want to give
-
two big-picture arguments.
-
These two big-picture
-
arguments, I think,
-
give us an understanding
-
of the macro-level
-
argument for the big
-
picture of evolution
-
and the big picture
-
of scripture.
-
Right?
-
So, these are going to
-
basically come down to
-
evolution occurred
-
and two, God created
-
the world.
-
Right?
-
So, these are the two
-
propositions that I'm
-
going to be dealing with
-
with two different kinds
-
of arguments.
-
And then, just to give
-
you a flavor about how
-
this cashes out,
-
and then we're going to
-
talk about criticisms.
-
Again, the breadth
-
of this position is so
-
wide that you're going
-
to find people who
-
will argue these two
-
propositions in
-
completely different
-
ways.
-
And then they're going
-
to argue with each
-
other over how your
-
solution to this
-
problem, or this
-
coherence, is wrong,
-
but mine is right.
-
Okay?
-
So, I'm not pretending
-
to sort of present
-
this is the unified
-
front of theistic
-
evolution.
-
In fact, probably the
-
two arguments I'm going
-
to put forward
-
forward, they're not
-
mutually exclusive,
-
but the people who
-
would argue for one or
-
the other probably
-
wouldn't agree with
-
each other.
-
So, anyways, again,
-
that's just the nature
-
of this position.
-
So, the first one is
-
going to be pretty
-
hard, and it's going
-
to be dry.
-
So, prepare yourself.
-
This is a philosophical
-
argument.
-
Okay?
-
So, and I've tried to
-
boil it down, but again,
-
there's an entire book
-
on it.
-
So, the book you're
-
going to want to read
-
if you want more on
-
this is Where the
-
Conflict Really Lies
-
with Alvin Plantinga,
-
where he famously
-
puts forward this
-
argument.
-
So, this is how the
-
argument goes.
-
Humans have cognitive
-
faculties such as
-
memory, perception,
-
intuition, introspection,
-
testimony, sympathy,
-
moral sense, etc.
-
You can go along the
-
lines, and we all
-
intuitively understand
-
our cognitive faculties
-
to be mostly reliable.
-
Right?
-
We believe that our
-
memories are able to
-
give us reliable
-
information, if not
-
perfect information.
-
We believe that our
-
ability to perceive the
-
world is perceiving a
-
real world.
-
It's not an imaginary
-
world.
-
Right?
-
We make predictions
-
based on these.
-
Our intuition about
-
logic, mathematics,
-
these are what we
-
consider to be reliable.
-
Our introspection about
-
our own mental states,
-
our own thoughts and
-
feelings, we believe is
-
reliable, etc.
-
We can learn from
-
testimony from other
-
people to teach us
-
things.
-
Now, here's where it
-
gets complicated.
-
Naturalism, which I'm
-
going to call N because
-
I didn't have space on
-
the slide to keep on
-
writing naturalism.
-
Naturalism N posits
-
that these faculties are
-
merely neurophysiological
-
properties.
-
Okay?
-
Now, depending on how
-
you make the argument
-
from materialism, you're
-
going to either be a
-
reductive or an irreductive
-
unreductive?
-
Nonreductive.
-
That's the one.
-
Some prefix reductive
-
materialist, right?
-
You're going to be
-
arguing either that the
-
mental, the cognitive
-
faculties are
-
neurophysiological
-
properties or that they
-
are neurophysiological
-
properties that also
-
unrelatedly produce a
-
mental state that has
-
some sort of content.
-
Again, there's an entire
-
book.
-
Read it.
-
For the time being,
-
naturalism posits
-
faculties are merely
-
neurophysiological
-
properties.
-
Okay?
-
That's one.
-
Two, evolution, which
-
I'm calling E, does not
-
select for faculties that
-
are true.
-
They select for only
-
advantageous behaviors.
-
Right?
-
Evolution doesn't care
-
whether you think that
-
your mental states or
-
that your ability to
-
remember five seconds
-
ago is true.
-
They only care that you
-
don't do stuff that's
-
going to get you killed.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Right?
-
So you could believe
-
anything.
-
You could believe that
-
everything in the whole
-
world is purple.
-
Right?
-
But as long as you eat,
-
as long as you reproduce,
-
as long as you survive and
-
are able to function,
-
you're going to be doing
-
well in life.
-
Okay?
-
This is a well-known
-
effect of evolution that
-
it only selects for
-
functional behavior.
-
It does not select for
-
content.
-
Right?
-
So, this is where it
-
gets confusing, but
-
follow with me.
-
If naturalism and
-
evolution are both true,
-
then we have good reason
-
to believe that our
-
mental faculties are not
-
reliable.
-
Because there are
-
neurophysiological
-
properties that are only
-
selected based on their
-
fitness.
-
They're not selected based
-
on their connection to
-
reality.
-
Right?
-
How close your
-
neurophysiological properties
-
are to a quote-unquote
-
truth is unrelated to how
-
they're going to affect
-
your fitness in the
-
evolutionary process.
-
That's the argument.
-
So, if both
-
naturalism and evolution
-
are both true, and we
-
have good reason to
-
believe that, to doubt
-
our own cognitive
-
faculties, then that
-
means that we have a
-
reason to doubt our
-
understanding that
-
naturalism and evolution
-
are true, or any
-
proposition is true.
-
Therefore, if naturalism
-
and evolution are both
-
true, then we have a good
-
reason to believe that
-
they are both not true.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Sort of.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Again, this is an
-
argument.
-
Right?
-
So, this isn't a given.
-
Alvin Plantinga is arguing
-
that this is true.
-
So, if you read his book,
-
he's going to argue for the
-
fact that naturalism posits
-
neurophysiological
-
properties.
-
He's going to argue that
-
evolution does not select
-
for true cognitive
-
faculties, only faculties that
-
are advantageous
-
behaviorally.
-
right?
-
I find his arguments
-
persuasive.
-
You may not, but this is
-
how the argument goes.
-
Right?
-
Does that make sense to
-
everybody?
-
How if evolution is both,
-
if naturalism and evolution
-
are both true, then naturalism
-
and evolution are both
-
false.
-
Does that make sense?
-
So, how does the theistic
-
evolution get in here?
-
Sorry, go ahead.
-
Before you even went on to
-
your second statement there,
-
it says evolution does not
-
select for faculties that are
-
true, only those that
-
produce advantageous
-
behaviors.
-
You could have stopped
-
right there and I would
-
have said, oh yeah,
-
that's totally contradictory.
-
Yes.
-
Yeah.
-
But, remember, this is a
-
philosopher.
-
He can't stop there.
-
He's got to go, he's got to
-
have at least nine different
-
parts to his syllogism.
-
Otherwise, other philosophers
-
will say, hey.
-
Sorry, yeah.
-
I just wanted to, it's not
-
just Alvin Plantinga, right?
-
Like, this is a very common
-
old argument.
-
I remember C.S. Lewis
-
making this argument and it
-
comes up a lot.
-
I love you, Tom.
-
This is, okay.
-
Watch this, okay?
-
Check this out.
-
You're predictive.
-
Okay.
-
So, this is the basis of the
-
argument, right?
-
So, now, based on this
-
argument, you can argue
-
either naturalism is true and
-
evolution is false or
-
evolution is true and
-
naturalism is false.
-
Does that make sense?
-
You can't have them both
-
together based on this
-
argument.
-
Now, since theistic
-
evolution assumes the
-
truth of evolution, right?
-
We already argued that.
-
We didn't argue that.
-
I just posited that.
-
That's the truth.
-
This argument necessitates
-
the fact that naturalism is
-
false.
-
Therefore, some sort of
-
theism, some naturalism is
-
not true.
-
Therefore, most likely theism
-
is true.
-
Does that make sense?
-
How evolution, the truth of
-
evolution could lead
-
philosophically to the belief
-
that God must exist in some
-
sense, right?
-
So, as Tom pointed out, this
-
is actually a formal way of
-
articulating C.S.
-
Lewis's own intuitive
-
disagreement with naturalistic
-
evolution, in which basically
-
he was saying that if we're
-
just a collection of atoms
-
bumping in the night, then why
-
should we care at all what two
-
atoms rubbing together think?
-
Right?
-
So, if you're arguing for
-
naturalistic evolution to me, in
-
which you're saying that I'm just
-
a collection, an interesting
-
collection of atoms altogether,
-
and you're in a different
-
interesting collection of atoms
-
altogether, his argument is,
-
why do I have to listen to
-
your atoms?
-
Right?
-
It undermines the bases of
-
rational thinking.
-
Okay.
-
That's argument one.
-
Again, there are arguments for
-
it.
-
The next argument for theistic
-
evolution I'm going to present is
-
what I call the fine-tuning in
-
convergent evolution argument.
-
So, in evolutionary theory, there is a
-
phenomenon known as convergence.
-
What is convergence?
-
Well, I'll tell you.
-
Convergence is where genetically and
-
historically isolated populations give
-
rise to animals, to functions that are
-
very eerily similar.
-
Okay?
-
So, we can look at the macro scale and
-
say, we got wolves here who look very
-
wolf-like.
-
We have hyenas here who also are looking
-
pretty similar.
-
And we also have what is now an extinct
-
organism, the Tasmanian tiger, which I
-
think should be called the Tasmanian
-
wolf, but whatever.
-
So, you have three different groups.
-
Right?
-
And maybe you're thinking on the
-
evolutionary paradigm they are closely
-
related and therefore, you know, they're
-
just modifications of each other.
-
Well, in fact, if you use the genetics,
-
phylogenetically, which is a fancy way of
-
saying evolutionary relationship between
-
these three is actually very distant.
-
Okay?
-
They're not actually related.
-
Well, I mean, if you take universal
-
common ancestry, everything is related.
-
Right?
-
But that's not the point.
-
What I'm pointing out is that
-
evolutionarily they're not in the same
-
tree.
-
They're on a different branch.
-
Right?
-
But they look incredibly similar and they
-
do exactly the same job in their
-
environments.
-
And their environments are not
-
particularly similar.
-
You know, the Tasmanian dude, he's
-
living out in Australia, which is not
-
known for being the same as Northwest.
-
Right?
-
I mean, I've never been to Australia.
-
I'm sure it's very nice.
-
I mean, unless you like Australia, which
-
Northwest is not very nice.
-
Anyways.
-
And then you have the hyena, which is
-
living in a different environment.
-
And so the argument is this phenomenon
-
that everybody, all evolutionists, will
-
acknowledge this is something that has
-
happened.
-
Right?
-
It's not in controversy that these three
-
different species are unrelated, although
-
they look very similar and do very similar
-
things.
-
And this isn't the only example I could
-
give.
-
I could give examples of different sort of
-
functions, sort of echolocation.
-
Right?
-
Echolocation is a very rare way of hunting,
-
but there's a whole bunch of different
-
unrelated organisms in evolutionary theory
-
have developed echolocation in their own
-
way, like bats and whales and not whales.
-
I think there's bug.
-
There's some kind of bug that does it, too.
-
What's up?
-
Well, no, that's not right.
-
I don't even know.
-
I don't know.
-
I am a biologist.
-
I don't even know what I'm talking about.
-
Okay.
-
So based on these observations, a theistic
-
evolutionary advocate will argue that
-
evolution isn't as random as is proposed by
-
materialists.
-
And in fact, while the mechanism of
-
evolution is in one sense random because
-
of the mutations and the natural selection,
-
there seems to be some sort of fine-tuning
-
of the whole process, some sort of
-
constraint on the whole process that
-
produces specific animal forms consistently.
-
And this would be very unlikely on
-
naturalism if it were to be true.
-
Right?
-
On naturalism, you would expect evolution to
-
be very contingent, which is another way of
-
saying a very random, historically
-
unpredictable situation.
-
But on convergent evolution, it seems like
-
no matter where you are, things, the
-
evolutionary process sort of gives you the
-
same results in a way, depending on no
-
matter where you go.
-
Right?
-
And so the TE advocate would argue that this
-
implies that evolution had us in mind, which
-
is harmonious with belief in God and it's less
-
likely based on theism.
-
Whew.
-
Okay.
-
Does everybody understand that?
-
Make sense?
-
Okay.
-
Let's move on to general critiques of theistic
-
evolution.
-
evolution.
-
The first of which, and again, the TE group is
-
very broad.
-
Right?
-
So, you know, there are people within the
-
group who are very orthodox.
-
There are people in the group who are not as
-
orthodox.
-
What the general critique of it is, is that it, as a
-
worldview, depending on how much of the
-
interpretations of the data and the corresponding
-
worldview that you accept leaks into your
-
theology.
-
Right?
-
So, examples of this.
-
TE advocates often argue that human beings
-
didn't originate from a single population.
-
Some do, some don't.
-
But this can undermine human uniqueness.
-
Another way of, another group may posit that
-
Adam and Eve didn't exist in any sense, which
-
produces theological problems in a variety of
-
different ways.
-
It's not intractable theological problems, but
-
it's not, it's, it's, it does provide some
-
issues.
-
Right?
-
Additionally, many have challenged the idea of
-
original innocence, that human beings were made
-
morally good or morally innocent, which, in
-
contrast, sort of undermines the entire idea of the
-
doctrine of original sin.
-
In some ways, it would argue against a fall, which
-
would then give us the doctrine of original sin.
-
And concomitantly, you often get TE advocates that will
-
argue for an alternative atonement than
-
substitutionary atonement, which is the, the, the,
-
basically the gospel as understood by evangelicals.
-
Right?
-
Is substitutionary atonement.
-
Not that there are other atonements aren't in
-
activity, but in the gospel, substitutionary
-
atonement plays a major part.
-
Right?
-
And then, maybe you would argue that this is an
-
unfair criticism of theistic evolution because
-
there have been different arguments for atonement in
-
the entire history of Christianity.
-
And I would argue that that's true.
-
Although, basically there are two major themes in
-
Orthodox Christianity for atonement.
-
In the Western side, we have substitutionary
-
atonement.
-
On the Eastern side, we have kenosis.
-
Am I doing that right, Tom?
-
Is that unrelated?
-
Okay.
-
I mean, it's similar.
-
Yeah.
-
So.
-
Ancestral sin instead of original sin.
-
Right.
-
Right.
-
And then the idea is not that God is here to, to
-
atone for moral sins, law-breaking, but to
-
atone for death by introducing life.
-
If you want to learn more about that, Athanasius.
-
Yes.
-
Can you clarify what's meant by original
-
innocence?
-
Since we wouldn't describe sin to a lion eating the
-
buffalo that it finds.
-
Yeah.
-
So they would argue that, that modern humans, as we
-
understand them, were never innocent.
-
Right?
-
Different strains of...
-
What does the word innocent mean?
-
So the word innocent means that they, they had
-
not sinned until the fall, basically.
-
So there were, they did nothing morally evil until
-
the fall occurred, which introduced in original
-
sin.
-
Right?
-
So in an evolutionary and some assessments of, of
-
the evolution of humanity, you're going to get
-
modern humans, you know, killing and other
-
untoward things, other human beings.
-
And that is an important or essential part in the
-
history of the evolution of humanity.
-
Right?
-
And so depending on how, where you place humanity,
-
right?
-
Because that is an open question in evolutionary
-
arguments.
-
At what point do hominins become modern humans?
-
And there's a whole debate over that.
-
And it's not very clear.
-
But depending on where you fall on that, on the
-
theistic evolutionary side, that's going to depend,
-
determine whether or not you believe that there was
-
such a thing as original innocence.
-
Whether human beings were ever made morally
-
innocent.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Right?
-
So does that exclude sin as a possibility?
-
Or does that just mean that we were always pretty
-
messed up?
-
Yeah.
-
So that would argue that we were pretty messed up
-
from the beginning.
-
Right?
-
That's the kind of argument I'm talking about here.
-
Now there are other kinds of arguments that say
-
in some sense sin had been influencing the evolutionary
-
process.
-
And so the story of Genesis is really an argument about
-
how that sin in the process of nature affected human
-
beings, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
-
Right?
-
Is there any sense where like, oh yeah, the devil, he came in
-
and messed things up?
-
That's a very common position.
-
Well, I wouldn't say very common, but it is a common
-
position.
-
But that's not even restricted to theistic evolutionists,
-
actually.
-
That's also a creationist position, depending on the group,
-
who argue that, so for instance, if you're an old earth
-
creationist, you're going to be more open to the idea of the
-
devil influencing the history of the world in which you get
-
extinctions and et cetera.
-
Right?
-
Again, depending on what kind of old earth creationist you are.
-
This next one, potentially enhancing the problem of evil,
-
depending on, again, the TE argument you make.
-
On some formulations of TE, the world as it is now is the way
-
it should be.
-
Right?
-
There has been no cataclysmic sort of fall.
-
The evolutionary process as it works today, as we imagine it
-
working backwards in time, is the way that God meant it to be.
-
Right?
-
So that implies that natural evil, and possibly even moral evil of
-
human beings, depending on whether you believe there was original
-
innocence in human beings, are part of God's good creation.
-
Right?
-
Now, a TE advocate would say, well, theistic evolution suffers from the
-
problem of evil like everybody else does.
-
And they suffer in many of the same ways as old earth creationism does.
-
But in this specific way, there is a difference, because many in the
-
creationist camps would argue that in some sense the fall of human beings,
-
if not the fall of creation, depending on how you understand that, has affected the
-
way that nature works.
-
And so if you were to study nature now and extrapolate backwards, you would get a bad
-
picture of history.
-
As opposed to the TE argument, often, which says, no, we get an accurate picture of the
-
way history was.
-
That's just good, in a sense.
-
Does that make sense?
-
And so now, this leads to very interesting and possibly problematic views of atonement.
-
So if we're talking about alternate views of atonement, based on this understanding of
-
the problem of evil, this version of atonement imagines that the crucifixion of Jesus in God
-
is God, in some sense, taking responsibility for his creation by entering into our suffering.
-
Right?
-
He says, God's good creation creates this suffering in this TE argument.
-
And in the crucifixion, God is not staying separate.
-
He is entering into the suffering of creation as a way of taking responsibility for his creative
-
act, which I think can lead to a variety of theological problems.
-
Yeah, lay it on me.
-
I know we've got to move on, but just real quick, would this idea that the nature of
-
the way it should be, which includes natural or moral evil, being good, does that lend itself
-
to sort of like moral progressivism?
-
Like, well, we just need to keep getting better and better until, you know, we fix everything.
-
Yeah, I mean, that is one way of doing it, is one way of understanding it.
-
The problem is, and I think that's a legitimate argument, the problem is, how do we score
-
that view with the view of scripture?
-
Right?
-
Right.
-
Yeah.
-
So, I mean, that's my point about it being a theological problem.
-
Right.
-
Because, I mean, many of the TE arguments make logical sense and philosophical sense.
-
The problem is, if we're thinking about the biblical theology that we get based on our
-
last class with Nick and my good friend Tyler, how do you get those streams, how do you get
-
those storylines, those narratives in the Bible, if that's what's going on?
-
Right.
-
Okay.
-
Okay.
-
I'm going to get to the arguments of intelligent design, and I'm going to fly through them,
-
because we can't leave the building after 1025.
-
Okay.
-
Basics of ID arguments.
-
So, in the same sense that I outlined how TE arguments go, I'm going to argue how ID
-
arguments go.
-
ID arguments can come in two streams.
-
And, again, they're scientific arguments, as they would construe them.
-
So, they're going to use scientific evidence to posit design in nature in two different
-
ways.
-
They can use negative arguments.
-
Negative arguments means that they seek to make naturalistic explanations of scientific
-
data, the data output that we talked about earlier, make those naturalistic interpretations
-
less likely, and on average make theism more likely.
-
Positive arguments that provide empirical evidence that suggests that design is more likely.
-
You see how that works?
-
There's sort of mirror images of each other, but there is a difference.
-
Right?
-
To say, this naturalistic mechanism is not likely, is not the same as saying, this phenomenon that
-
we see gives me evidence of design.
-
Does that make sense?
-
I think there's a place for both of them.
-
I think they both have their own potential flaws.
-
But, either form of this argument is going to be using the inductive interpretative scientific
-
method in history called inference to the best explanation.
-
Right?
-
So, in the historical sciences, you have a phenomenon that you're trying to explain.
-
What you do is you fan out a whole variety of different hypotheses of what could explain
-
this.
-
And, inference to the best explanation is the interpretative method in which you say, how
-
do you decide between these different hypotheses?
-
Right?
-
And so, ID arguments trade on this form of reasoning to argue that, given a variety of hypotheses
-
for a specific phenomenon, the inference to the best explanation is going to give us
-
some sort of design.
-
Some sort of intelligent agency.
-
So, I'm not going to give you negative arguments, because I think that they have their own issues
-
that are, and they're less interesting.
-
So, maybe two positive arguments.
-
I'm going to focus on two arguments that are often used.
-
These are sort of the bread and butter, you might say, of the ID position.
-
And these different arguments can actually be applied to different fields in different ways.
-
So, I'm going to be focusing on the biochemistry side of things, because that's what I do, or
-
that's what I've done, or, I don't know.
-
That's not who I am, but, you know, you get my point.
-
I'm a biochemist.
-
I guess I am a biochemist.
-
What am I, what am I, I'm not fooling myself.
-
Okay.
-
So, the first argument is going to be complex specified information in DNA.
-
Okay.
-
So, what are we talking about when we say complex specified information?
-
Well, according to information theory, there are two components that can modify what we
-
call information and give it different properties.
-
Okay.
-
These two, as you might guess, are complexity, which describes the improbability of a configuration
-
or sequence of characters.
-
Specificity, which is a configuration fitting to an independent pattern that conveys meaning.
-
Okay.
-
You can have a complex information that's not specific.
-
You can have specific information that's not complex.
-
And you can also have complex specified information.
-
Okay.
-
What does that look like?
-
This is very complex.
-
In this understanding of complex.
-
Okay.
-
I just literally took my keyboard and went, okay.
-
But, so you say it's random.
-
Complexity and randomness are not in opposition.
-
Right.
-
When we say complexity, we mean the likelihood, if we're doing probabilities, the likelihood of
-
this sequence of characters is very, very low.
-
It's very improbable.
-
Right.
-
Because how many letters are other than the alphabet?
-
I'm really asking.
-
I totally forget.
-
26.
-
Okay.
-
Okay.
-
How many sections are there in the sequence?
-
We got, you know, I'm not going to do the math.
-
But anyways, for every position of here, there's a, the likelihood is 1 to the 26 that you're
-
going to get this one compounded across the section.
-
It's very improbable.
-
It's the same thing as looking at a giant pile of rocks and saying the likelihood that they
-
landed in exactly that position is very low.
-
Right.
-
Right.
-
You couldn't, probability wise, you couldn't place them in that order to try to get that
-
configuration.
-
Right.
-
It's just astronomically hard to do.
-
The next example is specified information.
-
This means something to us.
-
Right.
-
Two.
-
It corresponds to a preexisting standard that we can apply to.
-
Right.
-
Two.
-
We know it's a word.
-
It means something.
-
Right.
-
Two.
-
I'm not going to describe it.
-
Anyways, you guys get it.
-
Two.
-
But it's specified, but it's not complex.
-
Right.
-
The, the likelihood of a T being next to an O are actually not that hard given randomness.
-
Right.
-
You're just kind of like, you know, if you're, I don't know if you've ever been bored at
-
the computer trying to write and you just do this, you're going to get T twos.
-
You're going to get thes.
-
You're going to get wees.
-
Right.
-
Very short sequences that correspond to what we would call a separate thing.
-
Right.
-
Now, complex specified information is information that is both complex and specified.
-
Right.
-
It's very unlikely to get this sequence in a row if you're just playing on your computer.
-
And also, if you see this sequence in a row, it means something to you.
-
Right.
-
Right.
-
It is not just random stuff in a row.
-
You're like, oh, I get information from that.
-
Right.
-
So how does this go into ID?
-
When information is both complex and specified, it is universally the product of intelligence.
-
Complex specified information does not occur under this understanding from random processes.
-
At the very least, at the base, you're going to find intelligence as the, as the result of it.
-
So DNA, this argument goes, contains complex specified information in the form of nucleotide triplets that serve to represent amino acids and protein coding sequences.
-
Right.
-
And this isn't an analogy.
-
This is actually true.
-
The triplets, the sequences in DNA form triplets.
-
And these triplets have no physiological connection to each other.
-
There's no necessary reason why these three should be next to each other or why the chemistry of these three makes a difference.
-
Right.
-
So the sequence is, is complex.
-
Right.
-
And it's specified because these specific nucleotides next to each other mean glutamine.
-
Right.
-
So based on this argument, therefore, inferring to the best explanation.
-
Right.
-
That's the way that ID arguments work.
-
Inferring to the best explanation, DNA originates from intelligent agency because given hypotheses, different hypotheses for the origin of DNA.
-
The likelihood of there being complex specified information outside of intelligence is low.
-
But the existence of complex specified information on intelligence is very high.
-
So if you're going to choose between them, intelligence design, intelligence is the best explanation.
-
Right.
-
What's that I hear?
-
Yes.
-
This does reject methodological naturalism.
-
Right.
-
If you're on methodological naturalism, intelligent agency is not a possibility.
-
Not a possible hypothesis.
-
So now among the non-intelligent group, you're going to have to choose between those options about what's the most likely hypothesis.
-
Right.
-
But if we understood, remember from section one or class one, methodological naturalism is not necessary to science.
-
So if you reject that assertion and include intelligent agency into the possible hypotheses, that is the best explanation.
-
Okay.
-
Okay.
-
Irreducible complexity of a biochemical, biomechanical machine, I should say.
-
So what is irreducible complexity?
-
Okay.
-
The way to understand irreducible complexity is it's a quality in a system where that system is dependent on multiple independent parts that produce a single function.
-
Where each part has no function separate from the parts in the whole.
-
Okay.
-
Classic example is the mousetrap.
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I know it's old and everybody does it, but it's a good example just to get our heads around the idea.
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Right.
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Each of these different components together is necessary for the mousetrap to do its single function, which is, unfortunately, to trap the mouse.
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Or fortunately, depending if you have a mouse problem.
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I lived in a house with a mouse problem.
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We never used mousetraps, but at a certain point you start to be like, okay, they ate my lazy boy chair.
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I'm getting close to throwing mousetraps everywhere.
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Anyways, so this piece right here is meant to release once the cheese is disturbed, which is going to release this piece, which is going to go forward because of the spring, which is then attached to the base.
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And every one of these parts is necessary for the mousetrap to do its function, but separately they don't do anything by themselves.
-
Okay.
-
So, how is this an argument for ID?
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There are examples of irreducibly complex systems in biology by argument, such as multiprotein complexes.
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So, for instance, you've got your ATP synthase.
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Right?
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Everybody knows what that is.
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Right?
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Of course.
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No, but ATP synthase is a motor that when stimulated by protons moving across a gradient, biologists, you know what I'm talking about.
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Basically, it spins and it can convert low energy molecules into high energy molecules.
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And these high energy molecules are what is necessary for biology to happen.
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Right?
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Because we're very unlikely, cells are very unlikely states of entropy and you need high energy to get them from.
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Anyways, I'm going through too much information here.
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But anyways, it's a very complex machine.
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Each of these different parts does its own thing.
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Separate from the machine, separate from the whole, these different parts don't do anything.
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Right?
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They don't produce a function such as converting something from low energy to high energy.
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Right?
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So, another example is the famous flagellum.
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It's a motor, spins the thing to let the bacteria move along.
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Okay?
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I'm not going to spend a whole lot of time on that.
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Because it's not necessary for the argument.
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All that needs to be true for the argument to be true is that each of these different components are necessary altogether to produce a function.
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And without one of these different components, the function would not occur in any sense.
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Okay.
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Irradiably complex systems are impossible to produce in a step-by-step Darwinian mechanism.
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As each component in the right order are all necessary to function, but they have no independent function.
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So, if you imagine the Darwinian mechanism as normally understood, each step in the mutation selection system is selecting for function.
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Right?
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That's what selection is separating.
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But you cannot produce a step-by-step machine that only functions when all the steps are together.
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Does that make sense?
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So, to step-by-step add each part to the system, you need to have foresight that the end product is going to be functionally helpful.
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But natural selection is unguided, does not have that foresight, and therefore cannot produce irreducibly complex systems.
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Okay?
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Therefore, intelligence agents, but we know that intelligence agents are capable of producing irreducibly complex systems.
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We invented the mousetrap.
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Right?
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It's not like we were sitting around, and we had all these different parts, and we're like, oh, you know.
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No.
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We knew when we put together the mousetrap, not us specifically, but human beings, intelligent agents knew what they were trying to produce.
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Therefore, inferring to the best explanation, irreducibly complex systems are the result of intelligent agency.
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Again, spread out the hypotheses, pick the one that makes the most sense.
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That's the idea for an intelligent design argument.
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Okay.
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Moving on to general critiques.
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I'm flying through them.
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I know, I'm sure we all could think of objections to any different parts of all these different arguments.
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I'm trying to put forward the arguments as stated.
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So, one of the general critiques of intelligent design is the God of the gaps fallacy,
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which essentially states that when we don't know what happened, we just insert God into the system,
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and that is the best explanation at that point because all the other explanations are very bad.
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Right?
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And this is actually, this criticism is valid when the gap is due to ignorance.
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However, the argument goes, there are gaps that are not due to ignorance.
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Potentially.
-
Potentially.
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Or are there.
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Are all gaps due to ignorance.
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Second, tension in creationism should be floating in your mind when I ask you that question, right?
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Whether we decide whether there's a gap of ignorance or not.
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Second, we got bad theology.
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Okay?
-
This criticism comes in many different forms.
-
One form says that by arguing for the apparent design of different features of nature,
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ID proponents are actually creating a dichotomy between that which God has created and that which he has not created.
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Right?
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And as Christians, we believe that God has created everything.
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So this creates sort of a bad dichotomy in theology for the activity of God.
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Another critique is to imply that God did not create a world that was sufficient for his purposes.
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God needed to intervene.
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And doesn't that mean that God was an ineffective creator if he has to intervene in his creation to institute a change that he wants?
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Couldn't he have just front-loaded everything?
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Isn't he powerful enough to do that?
-
And finally, this is actually sort of a heavy philosophical argument.
-
So if you're into that kind of thing, get ready.
-
So there's an argument that ID assumes the mechanistic nature of the modern view of the universe.
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And therefore, by God creating in the way that ID proponents argue, that makes God into a too-imminent anthropomorphic sort of deity.
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If that doesn't make any sense to you, it's probably because you're not Catholic.
-
Okay.
-
As opposed to transcendent and other?
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As opposed to, yes, transcendent, other.
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This argument is usually put forward by classical theists who argue that God is not imminent in the way that we are imminent.
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In the sense that he doesn't work the way that we work.
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To impose ideas on God based on our own activity is to anthropomorphize God.
-
Okay.
-
Okay.
-
Summing up.
-
We got through it.
-
Technically, almost 15 minutes over.
-
So, how does second tension in creationism help us understand these different views?
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Right?
-
If you're a providential creationist, they're not going to find any ID arguments convincing.
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Because a priori, meaning before the fact, God is asserted to work through secondary causation.
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Based on this view, you're not going to find any gaps that are not due to ignorance.
-
Right?
-
The other kind of gap we could talk about would be a gap due to the nature of the cause.
-
Right?
-
Sort of a gap between water and wine.
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We know water doesn't turn into wine.
-
Right?
-
There's a gap due to the nature of the substance and the activity that it produces.
-
And so, to infer intelligent agency there is legitimate.
-
But in creation, a providential creationist is to say there is no gaps due to the nature.
-
There is a secondary causation that can cause everything.
-
Because God did use secondary causation to cause everything.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Okay.
-
A designing creationist is going to be more comfortable with ID.
-
Surprisingly.
-
I mean, not surprisingly.
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And perhaps not feel the need to take what they would consider potential theological risks of TE.
-
Right?
-
If I'm comfortable with God doing primary causation in history,
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I am not wedded to the specific interpretations of the data that is being produced.
-
Therefore, I can criticize the interpretation, put forward my own interpretation,
-
and that keeps me safe from these potentially theological problems.
-
Right?
-
You can imagine this actually makes dialogue between ID and TE advocates very difficult.
-
Right?
-
This second tension.
-
Right?
-
Because you're going to have an ID person arguing scientifically, no, here is a gap due to nature.
-
And you're going to have a TE person arguing, there are no such things as gaps due to nature.
-
Right?
-
Right?
-
So, hopefully after this, no matter where you are on either position,
-
you can at least understand how a Christian can come to this position,
-
why they come to this position,
-
and maybe argue for your position based on their own assumptions,
-
and try to convince them on that way,
-
as opposed to producing an argument based on your own assumptions,
-
which is probably not going to get anywhere.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Okay.
-
That was the goal of the whole class.
-
Okay.
-
Thank you.
-
That's it.
-
Alright.
-
Questions afterwards.
-
This is actually already over time.
-
But if you have a question, I'll answer it in the next five minutes.
-
Can I just reiterate, you need to go, leave in a car, do that now.
-
Yes.
-
Yes, because you have ten minutes to leave before the run starts.
-
Really, you should be leaving now to get out in time.
-
Leave now, as opposed to the station of second service.
-
Right.
-
That's right.
-
Yeah.
-
I'm saying to the second service, we're good.
-
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
-
Yeah.
-
Or if you want to hang around until 1115.
-
No, I just want to make sure.
-
See you, Tom.
-
Second service is good.
-
I was waiting to have a question.
-
Oh, you have a question.
-
Lay it on me.
-
I was going to ask about the providential creationists.
-
Yeah.
-
So, how are they materially or substantially different from deists?
-
If they think that God just set everything up from the beginning and everything is secondary
-
and that he doesn't interfere, he doesn't come in in a personal, imminent way, to me,
-
that's deism, right?
-
I mean, isn't that...
-
So, yeah, it depends on how you're going to argue for that.
-
Because some would argue that God, in his sustaining of nature, that is activity, right?
-
God is, through his will, sustaining the natural properties of these different things.
-
And therefore, their activity is ultimately a result of God's activity.
-
And to say that God is hands-off is not true.
-
He has to be hands-on.
-
Otherwise, everything falls apart.
-
I see.
-
Okay.
-
The other thing there is...
-
The providential creationists are just saying, in creation, God is just working through secondary causes.
-
He only steps in and does the miracle thing at theologically opportune times.
-
So, they're not being full-on deists.
-
You can think of it kind of as deists about the process of biological creation.
-
Okay.
-
And some would be comfortable with that assessment, being called deists for creation.
-
Others would be very... would be rankled, if you call them a deist on creation.
-
So, there is difference.
-
There are some who are like, oh, yeah, for sure.
-
I'm a deist, essentially, until it comes into history, right?
-
Yeah.
-
Any other questions?
-
Lay it on me.
-
Maybe this is a sticking point about the imminent versus transcendent argument.
-
And I know that's more of a theological and philosophical thing.
-
Oh, yeah.
-
Doesn't matter.
-
Doesn't mean it's not important.
-
Well, sure.
-
And maybe I just need to do more background, not research on that whole debate.
-
But doesn't the dual divine human nature of Jesus sort of help us with that supposed dichotomy?
-
Like, that God is both imminent and transcendent?
-
Yeah.
-
But they would argue, if you're a classical theist, that that is restricted to history.
-
So, post-incarnation, God in his humanity in Jesus, we can anthropomorphize.
-
Well, he is.
-
It's not anthropomorphizing.
-
He's human.
-
Right.
-
So, attributing human traits to Jesus is legitimate.
-
They would argue pre-incarnation to attribute human traits to God is to anthropomorphize him.
-
Before he's anthropomorphized in the ultimate sense.
-
Why is this a problem?
-
Well, that is a great question.
-
Why is it a problem?
-
It's based on the actual, your view of God.
-
Right.
-
So, on the classical theist position, you have divine simplicity, impassibility, and timelessness.
-
And these three together form a view of God in which God is transcendent.
-
And the creation is sort of a causal eminence of God.
-
And God is not changed by the creation.
-
That's the impassibility part.
-
Right.
-
God is not changed by his activity of creation.
-
Think of creation in this view.
-
Creation is like a shadow and God is the real thing.
-
Right.
-
The thing doesn't change because of the shadow.
-
Right.
-
Right.
-
And so, to say that God is fiddling with the shadow seems to assume that God is changing.
-
And that's not allowed.
-
Does that make sense?
-
Yeah.
-
Remind me just one more thing.
-
Remind me what a classical theist is again.
-
Yeah.
-
I'm getting lost in all the definitions today.
-
Yeah.
-
So, it depends on who you ask.
-
Classical theist could be another way of just saying I'm an orthodox Christian with a view of God.
-
But there's a term of art called classical theism which asserts the view of God as understood in the first couple centuries.
-
Well, I mean, in their credit, the first millennia or so of Christianity.
-
Right.
-
Which is to view God based on Aristotelian understandings of myriology and other, sorry, understandings of how parts work, what metaphysics is.
-
Basically, if you assume an Aristotelian metaphysic or a Platonic metaphysic, then you're going to be restricted to a classical theist God due to the nature of the way that reality works.
-
But, if you reject the classical metaphysic, then these problems go away.
-
So, does it just come down to God's in the ability then?
-
Yes.
-
So, in classical theism, God's aseity, his self-sufficiency requires that he be impassable and simple and timeless.
-
So, that's why they would require certain constraints when we're talking about creation.
-
Exactly.
-
Well, that's not true.
-
I mean, necessarily.
-
They would argue perhaps God imbued nature with the ability to create systems that look designed.
-
I mean, that...
-
Right?
-
That's kind of...
-
But, so they're not arguing necessarily for evolution or that it's completely secondary causation.
-
They're saying that the way that ID arguments work assumes a God that is tinkering.
-
And God, based on their assessment, cannot tinker.
-
Or will not tinker.
-
Or cannot tinker.
-
I don't know.
-
It's a very confusing argument.
-
So, if you can get a handle on it, tell me.
-
I just need a lot of books is what I'm getting at.
-
Yeah.
-
I mean, you need like a PhD level education in philosophy.
-
Yeah.
-
It's very difficult to understand.
-
All right.